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Abstract 
 
Using a dataset which records banks’ ongoing requests of information from small commercial 
borrowers, we examine when banks use financial statements to monitor borrowers after loan 
origination. We find banks request financial statements for half the loans and this variation is 
related to borrower credit risk, relationship length, collateral, and the provision of business tax 
returns, but in complex ways. The relation between borrower risk and financial statement 
requests has an inverted U-shape; and tax returns can be both substitutes and complements to 
financial statements, conditional on borrower characteristics and the degree of bank-borrower 
information asymmetry. Frequent financial reporting is used to monitor collateral, but only for 
non-real estate loans and only when the collateral is easily accessible to lenders. Collectively, our 
results provide novel evidence of a fundamental information demand for financial reporting in 
monitoring small commercial borrowers and a specific channel through which banks fulfill their 
role as delegated monitors. 
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1.  Introduction 
When do banks use financial statements to monitor small commercial borrowers? In 
serving as delegated monitors, banks privately collect information from firms in order to 
discipline borrowers’ investment decisions and protect any proceeds in case of default. While 
banks may prefer firms provide financial statements throughout the term of the loan, financial 
reporting is costly and substitute monitoring mechanisms are available (Cassar, Cavalluzzo, and 
Ittner [2015]). In this paper, we empirically examine when banks use financial statements to 
monitor borrowers using a proprietary dataset of small commercial loans. The dataset includes 
not only loan contract terms (e.g., maturity, interest rate, amount, presence of collateral), but also 
the documents that banks request from the borrowers after the loan has been originated (e.g., 
financial reports, tax returns, and other non-financial information). We find that, although 
financial statements are the most requested document type in the dataset, banks use them to 
monitor small commercial borrowers for only half the loans in the sample. We model this 
variation in ongoing financial statement requests as a function of the bank-borrower relationship, 
borrower risk, use of collateral, business tax return collection, non-financial information, and 
other loan terms to better understand what factors are associated with the use of financial 
statements in the ongoing monitoring of borrowers.   
We motivate our analysis using theoretical frameworks which offer competing 
predictions for when banks and borrowers would agree to use financial statements.  For instance, 
the relation between a borrower’s risk and financial statement provision is not straightforward. 
On the one hand, ongoing financial reporting may be more beneficial for high-risk borrowers 
because commitments to higher levels of monitoring allow them to access credit (e.g., Jensen 
and Meckling [1976]; Watts [1977]). On the other hand, low-risk firms could be more likely to 
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produce financial statements and provide them to lenders on an ongoing basis to portray 
themselves as high quality borrowers. Still other theories indicate the relation between a 
borrower’s risk profile and the use of financial reporting is more complex and, in fact, non-
monotonic (e.g., Diamond [1991]).  
Alternative financial information sources and monitoring mechanisms are also prevalent, 
but the extent to which these alternatives serve as substitutes for financial reporting is unclear. 
For example, tax returns are an important source of financial information which firms are 
required to produce annually for the IRS. However, prior research has been unable to directly 
examine how or when tax returns mediate the usefulness of financial statements. Whereas tax 
returns are natural substitutes for financial statements because of overlapping information, recent 
findings suggest tax reports can complement financial statements because of the implicit 
monitoring role of the IRS (e.g., Hanlon, Hoopes, and Shroff [2014]). How financial reporting 
interacts with collateral is also unclear, a priori. The evidence in Bester [1987] suggests collateral 
reduces the need for financial statement monitoring, but the analysis in Rajan and Winton [1995] 
suggests the use of collateral enhances the demand for financial statements to monitor the 
existence and condition of pledged assets.  
Collectively, theoretical arguments produce a variety of predictions for when financial 
statements will be used as monitoring mechanisms in debt contracting. We distill the theoretical 
framework into three specific research questions to structure our empirical analyses: (1) How is 
borrower credit risk related to the propensity for banks to use borrower financial statements? (2) 
Are financial statements and collateral substitute or complement mechanisms? (3) How do tax 
returns relate to the use of financial statements? 
We investigate these research questions in the setting of small commercial loans. In this 
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setting banks and borrowers address information asymmetry problems exclusively through 
private reporting channels, rather than public disclosures (Diamond [1984], Fama [1985], 
Diamond [1991]; Rajan and Winton 1995]). Examining private information channels isolates the 
reporting motives related to the credit relationship, compared to public voluntary disclosure 
decisions which also take into consideration the reactions of competitors, suppliers, employees, 
and others.1 Moreover, the lack of a regulatory mandate in this setting allows us to better isolate 
a market-driven equilibrium of financial reporting. We present three main empirical results.  
First, we find banks collect financial statements more frequently from borrowers with 
middle-tier credit risk relative to borrowers with either high or low credit risk. This finding is 
consistent with the intuition of Diamond [1991]. Diamond suggests that low-risk borrowers 
require little monitoring because their positive reputation allows them to “have a lower cost of 
capital, and such a rating needs to be maintained to retain this source of higher present value of 
future profits.” As such, “these high-rated borrowers do not need monitoring” (pg. 690). By 
contrast, monitoring is ineffective for high-risk borrowers. According to Diamond, they have 
“less to lose if they reveal bad news about themselves by being caught when monitored. As a 
result, monitoring will not provide incentives for these very low rated borrowers” (pg. 690-691). 
Middle-tier borrowers, on the other hand, will undertake risky projects if not monitored, but have 
sufficient reputation that monitoring provides incentives not to do so.  These arguments suggest 
that financial statement monitoring is most beneficial for middle-tier borrowers. In non-
parametric tests, we find banks request financial statements least frequently from borrowers in 
the top and bottom quintiles of credit spread (our proxy for borrower credit risk) and about 25% 
                                                 
1 Privately held firms are not the only setting where private monitoring can be studied, however. Recent research 
also uses the setting of public firms by examining the extent and type of private communications agreed upon 
between borrower and lender in the publicly available contractual agreements (e.g., Frankel et al. [2011]; Carrizosa 
and Ryan [2016]).  
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more frequently from borrowers in the middle quintile. This finding persists after we control for 
a variety of loan contract terms, bank, time, loan type, and industry fixed effects.  
We also consider the endogeneity issue that credit spread is simultaneously determined 
with other contract features, including the provision of ongoing financial reporting. In alternative 
specifications that take into account the simultaneous choice of several loan contract features, we 
continue to find an inverted U-shape between borrower credit risk and financial reporting. This 
evidence suggests the relation between financial reporting and credit risk in the setting of small 
firm debt financing is non-monotonic rather than linear as typically modeled in the literature 
(e.g., Allee and Yohn [2009]; Minnis [2011]; Cassar et al. [2015]; Kausar, Shroff and White 
[2016]).  
Second, we examine the relation between the requests for financial statements and the 
provision of collateral. Theory broadly offers competing predictions for the relation between 
collateral and monitoring. On one hand, collateral can reduce the lender’s need to undertake 
costly monitoring because it offers protection in the event of default (Bester [1987]; Berger and 
Udell [1990]). On the other hand, collateral creates incentives for the lender to monitor to ensure 
its value (Rajan and Winton [1995]; Boot [2000]; Sufi [2007]; Göx and Wagenhofer [2009]). To 
examine the empirical relation between financial report requests and collateralization, our initial 
tests regress financial statement requests on the presence of collateral and other loan terms. 
These tests do not reveal a significant relation between collateral and financial statement 
requests. However, the existence and value of a firm’s collateral can change quickly, creating a 
demand for more timely information (GE Capital Commercial Finance [1999]; Contino [1996]).  
Therefore, we reexamine the relation between financial statement monitoring and collateral after 
conditioning on the frequency of the financial report requests (e.g., Leftwich, Watts, and 
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Zimmerman [1981]). When the dependent variable in the regressions is limited to financial 
statement requests made more frequently than annually (e.g., quarterly or monthly), we find a 
positive relation between financial statement requests and collateral, consistent with theories 
suggesting that banks use interim financial reports to monitor collateral.  
While we find that interim financial statements and collateral are positively correlated, 
the inference that banks use interim financial statements to monitor collateral could be incorrect 
because the positive relation could be driven by an omitted variable. In particular, borrowers 
with some unobservable characteristic could be more likely to both provide frequent financial 
reports and offer collateral. To mitigate this omitted variable concern, we use state-level 
foreclosure and repossession laws to measure the degree to which states are borrower- versus 
lender-friendly with respect to collateral recovery. We find the positive relation between interim 
financial requests and collateral present only in low recovery barrier (i.e., “lender-friendly”) 
states. In other words, banks are more likely to request financial statements in conjunction with 
collateral in those states where collateral is easily accessible to the lender, and therefore more 
beneficial to monitor. Collectively, these results provide evidence of a complementary role of 
financial reporting and collateral in debt contracting. 
In our last set of tests, we consider how the availability of substitute information from tax 
returns is related to a bank’s requests for financial statements. A common refrain among standard 
setters and academics is that financial statements are less beneficial for monitoring privately held 
firms because banks have access to alternative data sources, such as tax returns which report 
income statement and balance sheet related items (Berger and Udell [2006]; Botosan et al. 
[2006]; FAF [2011]). Recent criticisms of the complexity of Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) note a substitute role, and speculate borrowers are increasingly opting to 
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provide their lender with tax returns in lieu of financial statements (FAF [2011]). By contrast, 
academic research hypothesizes and finds evidence that the IRS serves as an implicit monitor of 
financial information, thus suggesting a complementary verification role of tax returns for 
financial statements (Hanlon, Hoopes, and Shroff [2014]).2  
We find that when a bank requests a tax return, the propensity for the bank to request a 
financial statement is 9% lower. Cross-sectional tests reveal this negative relation is more (less) 
prevalent when firms have significant intangible assets (assets in place) suggesting that financial 
reports are particularly useful or less costly to produce vis-à-vis tax returns when a firm has 
physical assets. Moreover, we find the propensity for a bank to request both financial statements 
and tax returns is increasing when information asymmetry between the bank and borrower is 
most salient: when the bank-borrower relationship is shorter, when the amount of non-financial 
information the bank collects is higher, or when the borrower has a middle-tier credit risk. Thus, 
while tax returns are generally substitute sources of financial information, they play an important 
complementary role to financial statements in monitoring borrowers when information problems 
are particularly severe.  
Our paper contributes to the empirical literature examining the use of financial 
information in debt contracting with small commercial borrowers (e.g., Allee and Yohn [2009]; 
Minnis [2011]; Cassar et al. [2015]; Sutherland [2016]).  In contrast to this prior work, we 
explicitly examine the ex-post monitoring role of financial information. We find the relation 
between financial reporting, borrower characteristics, and alternative mechanisms is not linear as 
                                                 
2 Informal interviews with bankers support both perspectives. The bankers suggest tax returns provide basic 
financial information and therefore can serve as substitute financial monitoring mechanisms. However, because tax 
returns have only basic balance sheets and do not have statements of cash flows, financial statements are generally 
more informative, limiting the substitute role. Supporting the complement perspective, the bankers suggested to us 
that IRS monitoring and unconditional conservatism (i.e., owners prefer reporting low taxable income) of tax returns 
make them useful to confirm information reported in financial statements. 
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typically modeled, but instead more complex and often nonlinear depending on the type of 
mechanism considered, the financial reporting frequency, the information environment between 
the bank and borrower, and borrower risk.  
We also offer evidence relevant to the debate surrounding financial reporting standards 
for private firms. A Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) study claims users (banks, in 
particular) and preparers view financial reporting as not surpassing a cost-benefit threshold, 
suggesting financial reporting can be unnecessary because banks have direct access to 
management after loan origination (FAF [2011]).3 As a result, the FAF initiated the Private 
Company Council to propose exceptions to GAAP for privately held firms. Based in part on this 
report, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) developed a new set of 
accounting standards for private firms (AICPA [2013]).4 While our paper does not resolve this 
debate, we contribute new empirical insights about how frequently banks find financial 
statements cost-beneficial for monitoring borrowers and the manner in which alternative 
information sources and contracting mechanisms substitute for reporting.  
Finally, our paper contributes evidence on the theoretical role of banks as delegated 
monitors (Diamond 1984; Fama 1985). Whereas substantial empirical literature infers that banks 
serve as monitors (e.g., Booth [1992]; Purnanandam [2011]; Wang and Xia [2014]), only 
recently has research investigated the specific mechanisms banks use to fulfill this role (Mester, 
                                                 
3 The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF), and 
National Association of State Boards of Accountancy (NASBA) created the Blue Ribbon Panel on Standard Setting 
for Private Companies and concluded, “There are urgent and growing systemic issues that need to be addressed in 
the current system of U.S. accounting standard setting” for private firms (FAF [2011], pg. 1). These concerns are not 
new (see Botosan et al. [2006] for a review and also see Bradshaw et al. [2014] for additional discussion of the 
debate).  
4 The main issue in the debate is whether financial reporting standards (i.e., U.S. GAAP) are appropriate for 
privately held firms. Both sides of the argument essentially point to efficiency issues: under one view, U.S. GAAP is 
inefficient for private firms (e.g., GAAP financial statements are not cost-beneficial mechanisms for use between 
banks and private firm borrowers); under the alternative argument, a regime with two separate GAAPs is inefficient 
(e.g., banks will find it costly to receive reports under multiple GAAPs). The purpose of our paper is to provide 
empirical evidence on the fundamental forces related to banks’ use of financial statements, which may inform the 
debate. 
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Nakamura, and Renault [2007]; Frankel et al. [2011]; Beatty, Liao, and Weber [2012]; Carrizosa 
and Ryan [2016]). We contribute to this literature by examining a specific mechanism through 
which banks collect private information—borrower financial reporting. These findings provide 
new insights on the use of various borrower monitoring mechanisms and how these mechanisms 
interact as complements or substitutes for monitoring small commercial borrowers.  
Although we conduct a range of robustness tests to confirm our main findings, we are 
cautious in interpreting our results for several reasons. First, our dataset is not collected from a 
random sample of banks, but rather from banks which decided to purchase the system we used to 
generate the dataset, potentially limiting the generalizability of our findings. The dataset also 
does not track firms over time or report loan outcomes, preventing us from examining 
relationship dynamics or the effectiveness of financial monitoring to influence outcomes. 
Moreover, although the dataset contains important details with respect to what documents banks 
request from borrowers, it is far from comprehensive and is limited on other details such as 
collateral descriptions, borrower characteristics or the accounting method (e.g., GAAP basis) and 
verification level (e.g., audit) of the requested financial statements. 
2. Theoretical Framework and Prior Research 
Since Diamond [1984], both theoretical and empirical research has asserted that a 
primary role of banks is to serve as a delegated monitor of borrowers (see Freixas and Rochet 
[2008] and Degryse, Kim, and Ongena [2009] for overviews). Monitoring disciplines the 
borrower’s behavior and allows the bank to take appropriate action in the event of a negative 
outcome, increasing the expected cash flows from the loan. Monitoring has two necessary 
components: information collection about borrower actions and performance, and contractual 
mechanisms to take action on this information. Without the former, the bank does not know 
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when to take action; without the latter, the bank is unable to take action.  
The contractual mechanism the debt contracting literature commonly studies is covenants 
(Smith and Warner [1979]; Armstrong et al. [2010]). Covenants include performance “trip 
wires” in the form of affirmative (e.g., insurance maintenance, financial performance ratios, and 
reporting requirements) and negative (e.g., limits to dividends or capital expenditures) provisions 
that specify when control shifts to the lender. For small commercial loans, the shift in control 
provisions typically relies on observable borrower actions such as requests for payment deferral 
or contract provisions that allow the bank to call the loan with sufficient notice.5 With legal 
provisions established, the bank needs information to assess borrower performance and to know 
when (and how) to take action. The information mechanisms that banks use are generally less 
well specified but include sources such as relationships and financial statements. We are 
interested in understanding when financial statements play a beneficial role in monitoring small 
commercial borrowers.    
Prior research highlights multiple roles for financial reporting as a monitoring device 
after loan origination (see Armstrong et al. [2010] and Christensen, Nikolaev, and Wittenberg-
Moerman [2015]). First, financial monitoring can constrain the borrower’s moral hazard 
problems because discovery of risky investments jeopardizes their future credit access. As a 
result, financial statement monitoring reduces the likelihood of negative loan outcomes because 
borrower actions are less risky. Second, in the event of an adverse outcome (e.g., a borrower 
request to defer payment) proactive collection of financial reports helps inform the bank whether 
such outcomes are arising from temporary liquidity issues that warrant flexibility, or more 
                                                 
5 The dataset researchers commonly use to study small borrowers (Survey of Small Business Finance) includes 
hundreds of questions, but none related to financial ratio covenants. Our dataset includes only minimal mention of 
financial ratios. According to discussions with bankers, financial ratio covenants are not as common in this setting 
because they require high quality financial statements (likely audited), constant calculation and review, and 
regulatory scrutiny when tripped.   
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serious problems that warrant calling the loan. Renegotiations also arise frequently during the 
course of the loan (Roberts and Sufi [2009]), and the bank can better respond to these events if it 
has been collecting ongoing financial information about the borrower.6 Finally, in the event of 
default, the bank can recover proceeds by selling any pledged collateral. Financial reports can 
provide relevant information about, and discourage misappropriation of, these assets. 
Collectively, monitoring borrowers through financial statements can benefit a bank’s cash flow 
realizations after loan origination. In this section, we discuss in more detail various theories 
which provide a framework for our research questions and motivate our empirical investigation.   
2.1 Relationships, Borrower Reputation and Risk 
Financial statements enable banks to learn about the borrower’s investment decisions and 
performance over time (Jensen and Meckling [1976]; Watts [1977]). As banks learn about 
borrowers and borrowers establish credit reputations, ongoing performance reporting—a key 
component of reputation acquisition models—becomes less beneficial (Diamond [1989]). 
Therefore, these theories predict that financial statement requests decrease monotonically in the 
length of the bank-borrower relationship. 
The predicted relation between financial statement monitoring and borrower risk, 
however, is not as straightforward. For instance, models based on agency theory suggest high-
risk borrowers commit to providing financial reports to gain access to financing, thus predicting 
a positive relation between ex-post financial monitoring and borrower risk. By contrast, sorting 
models in which banks partition borrowers by offering a menu of contracts (e.g., Bester [1985]; 
Besanko and Thakor [1987]; Dell’Ariccia and Marquez [2006]) suggest a negative relation 
                                                 
6 Even in the setting of public firms with high quality financial reporting, research indicates financial ratio covenant 
issues are responsible for only 18% of debt renegotiations, suggesting alternative mechanisms besides financial ratio 
covenants play an important role (Roberts and Sufi [2009]). 
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between borrower type and financial reporting. These models suggest low-risk firms will be 
willing to subject themselves to ongoing monitoring to receive better terms, whereas high-risk 
firms prefer a contract with lower monitoring (or cannot mimic the financial reporting regime) 
and less favorable terms in other dimensions of the loan contract. 
In contrast to either of the two monotonic predictions between financial monitoring and 
borrower risk, Diamond [1991] analytically examines the disciplinary role of banks, and argues 
the usefulness of ex-post monitoring is non-monotonic across the distribution of borrowers’ 
credit risks. In particular, the model predicts an inverted U-shaped relation between credit risk 
and costly monitoring activity. Low-risk borrowers possessing longer track records without 
default require little monitoring because they want to protect their earned reputations.  A high 
reputation ensures access to less costly and more abundant credit in the future, and firms’ desire 
to maintain a high reputation disciplines their investment decisions today.  
Borrowers that the bank perceives as high-risk (either because the firms lack a track 
record or have a history of default) do not have a positive reputation to lose. These borrowers are 
willing to take the chance that financial reporting to the bank will reveal their risky investments 
and will continue to undertake them—i.e., even in the presence of monitoring, high risk firms 
have incentives to make suboptimal investments from the perspective of the lender. For firms 
with middle-tier credit risk, on the other hand, ongoing financial monitoring disciplines the 
borrower’s actions and provides useful information to the bank in anticipating performance 
deterioration, renegotiation events, and payment defaults. Middle-tier borrowers have sufficient 
reputations to limit the risky investment behavior, yet their reputation is not sufficient to be 
trusted to make the proper investment choice in the absence of monitoring.7  
                                                 
7 Diamond [1991] formally proposes his model as a way of explaining firms with publicly traded (i.e., unmonitored) 
debt, bank (i.e., monitored) debt, and credit rationing. We rely on this model to explain the relative levels of 
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Financial statement monitoring not only disciplines borrower behavior, but also provides 
valuable information in the event of a payment deferral request or renegotiation.8 Because banks 
and borrowers must agree to the schedule of ongoing financial statement monitoring at the time 
of loan origination, and because producing, requesting and collecting financial statements is 
costly, banks need to anticipate for which borrowers the financial information will be most 
valuable. For low-risk borrowers, situations such as payment deferral requests are anticipated to 
be infrequent. For high-risk borrowers, payment deferral requests are more likely to indicate 
negative states of the world where the optimal outcome is for the bank to call the loan without 
additional consideration. In both cases, from an ex-ante perspective financial statement requests 
are costly and have little expected benefits. By comparison, decisions for middle-tier borrower 
requests are the most difficult and historically collected financial information (which reveals 
current performance trends and longer term seasonality trends) can be particularly valuable. 
Thus, this “information expectation hypothesis” predicts an inverted U-shaped relation between 
borrower credit risk at loan origination and financial statement monitoring, consistent with 
Diamond [1991]. 
2.2 Collateral 
Collateral serves two theoretical roles after loan origination in debt contracting: it 
disciplines a borrower to reduce risky activities ex-ante to avoid losing the asset in default, and it 
compensates the bank in the event of default. These roles produce conflicting predictions for the 
                                                                                                                                                             
monitoring within the bank debt setting. One reason why the small business loan market is an interesting setting to 
consider the Diamond model is that regardless of how high a reputation these small firms have, their loan size does 
not meet the scale necessary for publicly traded debt. Therefore, we expect to see borrowers with high credit ratings 
within the bank market. This also suggests that the inverted U shape would not be found in public debt markets 
because these firms have sufficient reputation that they are all located on the ‘downward’ slope of the relation (e.g., 
Carrisoza and Ryan [2016]).   
8This discussion is based on the incomplete contracting literature (Armstrong et al. [2010]; Christensen et al. 
[2015]), commercial banking literature (e.g., Gup and Kolari [2005]; Berger and Udell [2006]), and our interactions 
with commercial bankers.  
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relation between the provision of collateral and ongoing financial monitoring. On one hand, 
because collateral pledges are themselves monitoring mechanisms (by disciplining borrower 
behavior), and because they protect the lender in the event of default, they reduce the need for 
costly information collection activities over the term of the loan (Bester [1987]; Berger and Udell 
[1990]). This substitution hypothesis predicts banks will make fewer requests for financial 
statements from their borrowers if collateral is part of the loan contract.  
 On the other hand, in Rajan and Winton’s [1995] model, collateral creates an incentive 
for the bank to monitor the borrower more closely to preserve the expected proceeds from asset 
liquidations in the event of default. A role of the balance sheet is to provide information about 
the existence and (lower-bound) value of pledged assets, suggesting financial statements will be 
beneficial to lenders monitoring collateral (Sufi [2007]; Göx and Wagenhofer [2009]). 
Consistent with this notion, asset-based lending guides highlight the relevance of financial 
reports to track collateral.9 However, the informativeness of the balance sheet is contingent on 
the timeliness with which the lenders receive the financial statements. Collateral is useless in the 
event of default if its value has significantly deteriorated or the managers have absconded with it. 
Prior research finds that interim financial reports (those which occur more frequently than 
annually) allow principals to monitor with a more precise signal (Leftwich, Watts, and 
Zimmerman [1981]), suggesting frequency is an important attribute to consider when examining 
the use of financial reporting in monitoring collateral.  
Moreover, collateral is not homogenous, and the usefulness of financial reports will 
                                                 
9 For example, “ongoing monitoring of the collateral helps to maintain a business relationship on a basis that 
benefits both borrower and lender. By keeping track of the type and quality of collateral in the borrowing base, a 
lender can make available to the borrower the largest possible loan which can be supported by the collateral” (GE 
Capital Commercial Finance [1999], emphasis added). In equipment leasing markets, “lessors sometimes monitor a 
lessee’s financial condition during the lease by requiring that the lessee periodically submit financial reports, such as 
current balance sheets and profit and loss statements. With these, lessors can often spot potential financial problems 
and take whatever early action may be necessary to protect their investment… in some transactions, the reporting 
requirement may be burdensome, and if so, it should be reduced or eliminated” (Contino [1996], emphasis added). 
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depend on the type of asset pledged. For example, some assets such as real estate are easily 
observable by those outside the firm and cannot be pledged to another lender without a public 
filing. As a result, timely financial reports are less useful in informing lenders about the 
condition, existence, and ownership of real estate, especially considering the availability of 
public title information, appraisals, comparable transactions, and real estate indices that relate 
more to local economic conditions than to firm specific performance. In sum, the relation 
between collateral and the usefulness of financial statements as monitoring mechanisms is 
unclear theoretically and is conditional on the intensity of financial reporting and the nature of 
the collateral.  
2.3 Tax Returns as Alternative Information Sources 
Prior research also suggests an uncertain role of financial statements in loan monitoring 
because alternative information sources in the small commercial loan setting are prominent (see 
Berger and Udell [2006] for a discussion). For example, Cassar et al. [2015] find that credit 
scores reduce the usefulness of accrual accounting in loan origination decisions. An additional 
important source of financial information apart from financial statements is a firm’s tax returns 
(FAF [2011]). Firms report sales, expenses, assets, and liabilities in their tax returns, and because 
this information is required annually by the IRS, it can be considered a relatively low cost 
substitute for financial statements. However, it is not obvious that firms will always provide tax 
returns to their bank, or that tax returns will necessarily substitute for financial statements for 
monitoring purposes. Tax returns do not include cash flow statements, the balance sheets are not 
detailed, and the returns are not timely. Moreover, if firm owners consider tax returns personal 
information, then they may prefer not to provide them to the bank. As such, the ability for tax 
returns to substitute for financial statements in monitoring borrowers—even though all firms 
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produce tax returns—is an empirical question.10  
While tax returns provide overlapping information to financial statements, the IRS also 
serves as an implicit monitor of the information on the tax return. For example, Hanlon, Hoopes, 
and Shroff [2014] find that this implicit monitoring disciplines a firm’s financial reporting. 
Considering the typical U.S. private firm does not have their financial statements audited (Allee 
and Yohn [2009]; Minnis [2011]; Lisowsky and Minnis [2015]), this verification role could be 
particularly relevant in our setting. When the bank is less certain about the borrower or 
monitoring is particularly cost-beneficial, they can request both financial statements and tax 
returns—matching the higher information content of financial statements to the implicitly 
monitored results of the tax returns.11  
Additionally, the informativeness of a borrower’s financial statements to a lender will 
likely influence the tradeoff between financial statements and other information sources (Ball, 
Bushman, and Vasvari [2008]), such as tax returns. Verifying the value of intangible assets can 
be difficult, and creditors typically recover little from such assets in default (Watts and 
Zimmerman [1983]; Kothari, Ramanna, and Skinner [2010].12 Moreover, reporting and auditing 
                                                 
10 Our interviews with bankers and firm owners revealed these various tax return tradeoffs. These discussions 
suggested, while tax returns are frequently collected at the loan initiation decision, their usefulness as an ongoing 
monitoring mechanism is less clear and that owners receive negative utility to providing business tax returns. Also 
note that only firms with more than $250,000 in assets are required to report balance sheet items on the tax return. 
Unfortunately, we do not observe firm size in our dataset so are unable to exploit this threshold.   
11 For example, in a survey conducted by the Financial Executives Research Foundation (FERF) one banker stated: 
“We will often use tax returns to confirm certain information that we will not see from looking at GAAP statements 
alone. Tax returns become another level of verification or assurance, like audited financial statements” (FERF 
[2006], pg. 16). Bankers also suggested to us that they view tax returns as unconditionally more conservative 
compared to financial reporting, and therefore view taxable income as a useful conservative level of financial 
performance. The role of tax reporting as a complement to financial reporting contrasts with the view articulated in 
Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz [2006]. Those authors find that, in countries in which tax authorities tightly base tax 
income on book income, private firms are more likely to manipulate their earnings. Thus, tax reporting can make 
book reporting less informative. However, that view applies in the European setting for firms in which auditing is 
mandated and, thus, the potential complementary role for tax authorities as verifiers is muted.  
12 For example, Kothari, Ramanna, and Skinner [2010] state, “management-supplied estimates of the value of such 
intangibles are difficult to verify, and for contracting and monitoring purposes, their inclusion is of limited use. In 
contracting, these exclusions are justifiable because it is unclear that these items could be used to satisfy creditors’ 
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intangible assets is seen as particularly costly for smaller firms because of annual impairment 
testing, for example (FAF [2011]).13 By contrast, tax accounting uses less costly historical 
valuation and amortization of intangibles. Given the potentially limited usefulness of intangibles 
in debt contracting, therefore, financial statements are less likely to meet the cost-benefit 
threshold vis-à-vis tax returns if the firm has higher intangible assets relative to tax returns. 
3. Setting and Data 
 To examine our research questions concerning banks’ use of financial statements as a 
mechanism to monitor borrowers, we use a dataset provided by Sageworks Loan Administration 
(SLA).14 SLA is an online database platform that helps banks monitor loans in their portfolio. 
Upon entering loan terms into the system, banks schedule future document requests, including a 
description of the document and frequency (e.g., annually, quarterly, monthly). The SLA 
platform allows banks to create customized reports, such as a list of upcoming or overdue 
requests. Diamond [1984] envisions a delegated monitoring role for banks because of scalable 
technologies such as the SLA.  
The main source of innovation in this dataset for empirical research is the record of 
private document requests by the bank to the borrower. For each request, the dataset reports a 
description of the document and the date, frequency, and method by which the document is 
expected to be collected. In total, banks make more than 90,000 information requests from 
                                                                                                                                                             
claims given uncertainty about both their future economic benefits and/or whether property rights are sufficiently 
well-defined as to establish legal rights over these items” (pg. 261). 
13 Because Kothari, Ramanna, and Skinner [2010] speak more broadly of larger, public firms, it is useful to highlight 
that these issues are also relevant to smaller firms. As one example, the Financial Accounting Foundation report 
stated that smaller CPA firms (those with fewer than 5 partners) have “generally agreed that the cost of preparing 
GAAP financial statements has increased compared to the perceived benefits” and specifically pointed to goodwill 
impairment testing and acquisition accounting as examples of financial reporting issues which create cost-benefit 
concerns (FAF [2011], pg. G-9).    
14 See the accompanying online appendix for additional discussion of the SLA dataset and the small commercial 
loan setting—including types of loans, borrowing purposes, and various lending mechanisms.  
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borrowers across 697 unique document descriptions in our final sample. We manually code all 
requests and group them into several categories in Table B1 of the online appendix. The most 
frequently requested item is business financial statements, followed by tax returns, proof of 
insurance, and information about the owner’s personal wealth. The dataset also provides 
important loan terms: amount, origination date, interest rate, fixed or variable rate, maturity, and 
whether it is collateralized. Appendix A provides variable definitions. A loan-type code denotes 
whether the loan is a commercial and industrial (C&I) loan or a commercial real estate (CRE) 
loan. A borrower 6-digit NAICS industry code is reported for 43% of the observations.  
In Table 1, Panel A we report that our initial sample contains 9,290 business loans. We 
eliminate loans missing the contract terms or correspondence requests used in our main tests. 
Our final sample contains 4,518 loans made from 35 banks to 3,148 borrowers.15 Although SLA 
was launched in 2010 and we received the data in late 2012, 39% of our loans originated prior to 
2010. Table 1, Panel B presents the descriptive statistics for each of the variables for the 4,518 
loans that we analyze after truncating continuous variables at the 1% level in both tails.16 Banks 
request financial statements for 51% of the loans in the sample. We use the collection frequency 
field to determine which requests are for annual versus interim financial statements, and find that 
24% of financial statement requests are for interim statements.17 Because SLA does not record 
                                                 
15 We drop 947 loans because they did not contain any information in the correspondence file under the assumption 
that zero correspondence is measurement error as a result of a few banks newly installing the SLA platform before 
we received the data. Two banks are responsible for 80% of the no-correspondence loans. However, these 
observations could be interpreted as actually having zero correspondence. As shown in online appendix Table B3, 
our inferences are unchanged if we do not condition the sample on having at least one correspondence item or if we 
drop the observations from the two banks with the most missing correspondence loans.  
16 A univariate correlation matrix is tabulated in Table B4 of the online appendix. 
17 Because this point estimate is an interesting contribution itself, we triangulate this finding with evidence from two 
unrelated datasets. Allee and Yohn ([2009], Table 1) use the SSBF (Survey of Small Business Finance) to show that 
32% of firms that applied for a loan in the last three years produced financial statements. We consider this estimate 
to be a lower bound because firms with financial statements are more likely to secure credit. Cassar [2009] examines 
a survey from the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED), and shows that 61% (57%) of start-up ventures 
prepare an income statement (balance sheet) on a monthly basis. Because the PSED data focus on financial 
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specific details of the financial statement requests other than frequency, we unfortunately do not 
observe the level of financial statement verification or the basis of financial statement 
preparation (e.g., accrual or cash basis). Banks request business tax returns 43% of the time, 
which is notable considering that firms are required to produce them annually for the IRS. Given 
tax returns are requested less frequently than financial statements, this provides initial evidence 
that they do not substantially displace financial reporting despite the low marginal cost.  On 
average, banks make about 10 non-financial information requests (all requests that are neither 
financial statements nor tax returns) per year from each borrower (6 at the median).  
The average (median) loan size in our sample is $232,835 ($100,000), which is consistent 
with prior studies of small business lending. We measure relationship length using the 
origination date of the oldest loan we observe for a borrower, consistent with studies using the 
Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Small Business Finance (SSBF) dataset (e.g., Petersen and 
Rajan [1994]; Berger et al. [2005]). We find an average relationship of just less than three years, 
which is likely understated given our truncated measurement approach. We measure relationship 
breadth by using an indicator variable for whether the borrower has multiple loans with the bank, 
and find approximately half of the firms have more than one loan. Loans secured by collateral 
other than commercial real estate comprise 39% of our sample, slightly lower than the 53% of 
loans in the SSBF dataset (Cassar et al. [2015]). 
Our measure of credit risk is credit spread which is the difference between the loan’s 
interest rate and the US prime rate at loan origination. Although prior studies typically use credit 
spread to measure credit risk, it is measured after, or in conjunction with, the decision to contract 
on the provision of financial statements and, thus, has an endogeneity issue. Ideally, we would 
                                                                                                                                                             
statement production (a necessary, but not sufficient condition for bank collection), this evidence is a potential upper 
bound. Our 51% point estimate is between these two bounds.  
19 
 
like to have a measure of credit risk assessment independent of the ongoing provision of 
financial statements, because the provision of financial statements likely affects the perception of 
credit risk, and thus the credit spread offered. Unfortunately, such a variable does not exist in our 
dataset. Therefore, we measure borrower credit risk with alternative approaches to mitigate 
endogeneity concerns, which we describe in section 4. The average and median interest rates on 
the loans are both 6% and Table 1, Panel B reports that 41% of the loans have variable interest 
rates. 
Finally, we tabulate loan type. To categorize the type of loan, we start with the “loan-
type” variable provided in the dataset, which identifies loans as C&I and CRE as described 
above. We then use the tenor of the loan to separate C&I loans into “lines of credit” and “term 
loans” under the assumption that lines of credit have maturities of 12 months or less and term 
loans have maturities greater than 12 months. Table 1, Panel B indicates 23.3% of the loans are 
lines of credit, 45.3% are term loans, and 31.4% are commercial real estate loans.  
Before turning to the formal testing, discussion of a few caveats of the data is 
worthwhile. First, at least two potential sample selection biases exist. Implementation of the SLA 
system is not a random assignment across banks—it is a bank choice. In particular, banks with 
sufficient scale and sophistication likely produce a product similar to SLA in-house or choose 
larger vendors. Therefore, the external validity of our results could be limited. However, we note 
that although the identities of the banks remain confidential, information supplied by the vendor 
suggests banks in the sample range from approximately the 10th percentile to the 95th percentile 
in terms of assets across all banks in the United States, and operate in wide-ranging geographic 
locations and product markets. This bank heterogeneity in the sample mitigates concerns that 
banks from only certain regions or sizes select into the dataset. Another threat to external validity 
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is the limited window over which the data were collected. Most loans in the sample were 
originated between 2009 and 2012—the post-crisis era—and therefore, our findings may not 
apply to alternative time periods. 
Second, we have limited data about the banks and the borrowers. The former represents 
an issue in the sense that bank structure influences the manner in which the bank operates (Stein 
[2002]; Cole, Goldberg, and White [2004]; Berger et al. [2005]; Berger, Minnis, and Sutherland 
[2016]). We include bank fixed effects in our analyses to mitigate issues with unobserved 
heterogeneity across banks affecting our inferences. Lacking borrower data is more problematic 
because of omitted variable concerns. We attempt to address these concerns by including in all of 
our tests the size and observable terms of the loan, though we acknowledge a potential for 
omitted variable bias is not eliminated. Finally, many of the variables in our study are derived 
from simultaneously determined debt contract features, limiting the extent to which we can make 
causal statements.  
We mitigate each of these concerns where possible (e.g., using exogenous differences in 
collateral laws across states, using bank fixed effects, simultaneously bundling various loan 
characteristics), but the main thrust of our study is to provide a novel analysis of when banks use 
financial statements to monitor borrowers. The strength of our study is a direct measure of this 
construct using data from a broad cross section of banks.  
4. Empirical Tests and Results 
4.1 Conditional Means Analyses 
We begin our analysis with descriptive statistics conditional on financial reporting 
characteristics. Table 2 presents an analysis of the sample partitioned based on the level of 
financial statement reporting. Panel A partitions the sample based on whether the bank requests a 
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firm’s financial statements. When loans are larger, banks are more likely to request financial 
statements and non-financial information. On the other hand, credit spread and frequency of 
collateralization are similar for both groups. Panel B separates the sample of loans for which 
banks request financial statements into two groups based on whether the financial statements are 
requested annually or more frequently. This contrast is more distinctive. Loans for which banks 
request financial statements annually are very similar to those for which banks make no financial 
requests (compared to those in Panel A), whereas the loans for which banks request financial 
statements more than once per year are larger, more likely to be collateralized, and have 
significantly more non-financial information requests. This finding provides initial evidence that 
financial statement requests made on the intensive margin are distinct from those made on the 
extensive margin. Finally, Panel C partitions the sample into four mutually exclusive categories 
conditional on combinations of whether banks collect financial statements or business tax 
returns. Loans for which banks collect both financial statements and tax returns are the largest 
and also have the most non-financial requests. When banks collect neither financial statements 
nor tax returns, loan amounts are the smallest, relationships are the longest, and the level of non-
financial information collection is high.  
Table 3 partitions the sample based on credit spread (Panel A) and relationship length 
(Panel B) to provide an initial analysis of the link between credit risk, relationship length, and 
financial reporting. Panel A shows distinct relations between the risk of the borrower, financial 
reporting, and relationship length. The extreme quintiles (1 and 5) have the lowest levels of 
financial statement requests, whereas the highest are in the middle quintile, providing initial 
evidence of an inverted U-shaped relation between banks’ requests for financial statements and 
borrowers’ credit risk. Column 2 indicates that this inverted U-shape is particularly apparent for 
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on interim financial statements, which are more costly to request and provide.18 Relationship 
length is decreasing in credit spread, suggesting banks ration credit to the highest risk and least 
familiar borrowers. Panel B sorts loans into quintiles of relationship length, and shows financial 
statement requests are monotonically decreasing in the borrower’s relationship, consistent with 
this reputation source serving as a substitute for costly financial monitoring.  
4.2 Main Analyses 
We model bank requests for financial statements with the following OLS regression, 
subscripted by loan i:19  
 𝐹𝐹/𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 𝑄𝑄𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∗
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 𝑄𝑄𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅2𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5 ∗
𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6 ∗ 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7 ∗
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9 ∗
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽10 ∗ 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽11 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽12 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖. 
 
Our main variables of interest are those that measure the nature of the bank-borrower 
relationship, the borrower’s credit risk, the presence of collateral, and collection of tax returns. 
We measure the length of the bank-borrower relationship (Log Relationship Length) as the log of 
the number of months since the initiation of the oldest loan in the dataset. We measure the 
breadth of the relationship as an indicator for whether the firm has more than one loan with the 
bank (Multiple Loans). We use Credit Spread Quintile to examine the relation between credit 
                                                 
18 While Diamond’s [1991] predicted inverted U-shape is not restricted to financial reporting, we do not observe a 
distinct U-shape pattern for non-financial requests in column 6. We suspect that this is because many of these non-
financial requests are low-cost mechanisms specifically related to proof of a particular collateral item (e.g., UCC 
filing) or insurance, which would not comport to theory as tightly as a higher cost mechanism, such as financial 
reporting. In Table B8 of the online appendix, we also find that the inverted U-shape does not manifest when 
considering tax returns. This is consistent with tax returns being both less costly and less beneficial than financial 
statements, and thus not comporting to theory as tightly.     
19 Throughout the analysis, we use OLS specifications to ease the interpretation of the coefficients and avoid issues 
with multiple fixed effects in non-linear models (Johnston and DiNardo [1997]). Nevertheless, we show in Table B2 
of the online appendix that logit specifications do not alter our inferences. 
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reputation and financial statement requests and include the square of Credit Spread Quintile to 
identify a non-linear relation.20 Has Collateral is an indicator variable equal to 1 if we identify 
collateral other than commercial real estate associated with the loan and 0 otherwise. Business 
Tax Returns Requested is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank requests business tax returns 
from the borrower and 0 otherwise. 
We control for various characteristics of the loan, borrower, and bank with several 
variables. We include the log specification of Non-Financial Requests, which measures the 
amount of information the bank requests of the borrower that is not related to financial data. We 
include the log specifications of the size (Log Loan Amount) and maturity (Log Maturity) of the 
loan, and an indicator for variable rate loans (Variable Rate). We also include indicator variables 
for lines of credit and CRE loans (with term loans as the holdout category) to control for 
economic differences in loan type. 
 Finally, we include fixed effects for time period, bank, and 2-digit NAICS industry.21 
We have insufficient observations in several of the years to have an indicator for each one, so we 
group years that broadly overlap with distinct macroeconomic and loan underwriting periods: 
before 2003; in the years 2003 to 2007 (“pre-crisis” era); in the years 2008 and 2009 (“financial 
crisis” era); and in the years after 2009. As discussed in section 3, inclusion of bank fixed effects 
controls for unobservable bank characteristics.22 Because we only have industry codes for 43% 
                                                 
20 We use the quintile of credit spread as our main credit reputation variable for three reasons: (1) it is a more 
representative proxy for the underlying construct of a credit “rating” that Diamond [1991] envisions, which is not a 
reference to the distribution of credit spread per se; (2) the economic magnitude estimates are directly comparable to 
the quintiled descriptive results in Table 3; and, (3) it mitigates issues of outliers in Credit Spread. Nevertheless, in 
Table B2 of the online appendix we tabulate the results using the continuous specification of credit spread, and find 
very similar patterns.  
21 We provide industry-level detail of our sample in Table B5 of the online appendix. In a robustness test tabulated 
in A2 of the online appendix, we find our inferences are similar if we restrict our sample to the observations not 
missing industry information, though statistically weaker given the substantially smaller sample size. 
22 Unfortunately, we do not have characteristics of the banks themselves, so we cannot relate monitoring 
characteristics to bank-level characteristics. 
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of our observations, we group the remaining firms under a single industry indicator to ensure a 
sufficient number of observations for our tests. We cluster standard errors at the firm level to 
account for borrowers with more than one loan.  
Table 4 presents the main analyses of our paper. Column 1 excludes bank and industry 
fixed effects, whereas column 2 includes our full fixed effect structure without including the 
Business Tax Returns Requested variable.  Column 3 reports the results for the full model and 
shows that requests for financial statements are negatively (positively) associated with the length 
(breadth) of the borrower’s relationship with the bank. A one standard deviation increase in 
relationship length reduces the likelihood of financial statement reporting by 4%, ceteris paribus. 
Meanwhile, borrowers with multiple loan contracts with their bank are more likely to provide 
financial statements.23 The coefficients on Credit Spread Quintile and Credit Spread Quintile2 
are significantly positive and negative, respectively, suggesting a non-linear relation. Financial 
statement requests are increasing in the credit risk of the borrower initially, but at a quintile level 
of 3.3, the relation becomes negative. Note this inflection point is nearly the center of the 
distribution, consistent with the descriptive results in Table 3. The coefficient on Has Collateral 
is not significant, indicating no discernable relation between financial statement requests and the 
presence of collateral, on average. The coefficient on the Business Tax Returns Requested 
variable is significantly negative (financial statements are requested 9% less frequently when tax 
returns are requested), suggesting tax returns and financial statements are substitutes conditional 
on other loan characteristics, on average.  
In terms of the control variables, requests for non-financial documents are negatively 
associated with requests for financial statements, whereas the larger loans and those with shorter 
                                                 
23 Note that information requests are measured at the borrower level, not the loan level so although the average 
number of requests per loan may be predicted to be lower with multiple loans with a bank, the total number of 
requests is predicted to be higher because of the relationship breadth. 
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maturities have higher rates of financial statement collection. Although the frequency of 
financial statement requests does not differ between lines of credit and term loans (i.e., the 
coefficient on Line of Credit is not significantly different from zero), the coefficient on the CRE 
Loan indicator is significantly negative, indicating financial statements are requested about 9% 
less frequently than term loans, consistent with the prediction that financial statements are less 
cost-beneficial for monitoring real estate loans.24  
The dependent variable in columns 1–3 do not differentiate between annual or interim 
financial statement requests.25 Column 4 of Table 4 alters the dependent variable to equal 1 only 
when the bank requests interim financial statements (biannually, quarterly, or monthly). Two 
variable relations change as predicted. First, the relation with Has Collateral becomes 
significantly positive. When collateral is posted, banks request interim financial statements 
approximately 4% more frequently than when collateral is not posted.26 Second, the coefficient 
on Non-Financial Requests is significantly positive. When a bank requests increasing amounts of 
non-financial information, it also requests more frequent financial reporting. In other words, 
when banks have intensive information demands, frequent financial reporting serves as a 
complement to alternative information sources. Interestingly, where one might expect that the 
                                                 
24 One explanation for lower rates of financial statement requests for CRE loans relative to C&I loans is that 
appraisals and inspections are more useful for monitoring real estate. In Table B1 of the online appendix, we 
tabulate document request types partitioned by C&I and CRE loans, and find appraisals are more frequently 
requested for CRE loans, but financial statements are much more commonly requested (50%) than appraisals (5%) 
for CRE loans. Based on anecdotal banker comments, appraisals are useful mechanisms when banks originate loans 
but are less beneficial as a monitoring mechanism after origination. In Table B6 of the online appendix, we also 
examine the Table 4 results separately for CRE and C&I loans. We find the inverted U-shape pattern maintains with 
respect to interim financial reporting for C&I loans, but the results are generally not significant for CRE loans. 
These findings highlight that our main results are most prevalent when costs are higher (interim reports) and benefits 
are higher (C&I rather than CRE loans). 
25 To further corroborate our main results, we modify the dependent variable to measure the intensity of financial 
reporting using a reporting score. The score increases in reporting intensity and equals zero when the bank requests 
neither financial statements nor tax returns, and one (two, three) when the bank requests tax returns (financial 
statements, tax returns and financial statements). Our results using this approach, tabulated in column 4 of Table B8 
of the online appendix, are similar to our main results in Table 4.   
26 In Table B2 of the online appendix we separately control for collateral in the form of a guaranty (e.g., by the 
owner or the Small Business Administration) and find consistent inferences.   
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relation between financial statement requests and relationship length might be more negative 
when conditioning the dependent variable on interim financial statement requests, the findings 
reveal an insignificant relation. The analysis in column 5 is the same as in column 4 except the 
sample is conditioned on loans for which either annual or interim financial statements are 
requested; that is, we examine the intensive margin of financial reporting requests and find very 
similar results. These results highlight important differences between annual and interim 
financial statements in the small commercial loan setting. 
Collectively, Table 4 presents the main results of this paper: relationships and tax returns 
are negatively related to requests for financial statements; financial statements are requested 
most frequently from borrowers with middle-tier credit risk as suggested by Diamond [1991]; 
and, financial statement requests by banks are positively associated with the provision of 
collateral, but only if the financial statements are provided frequently. These results, however, 
are subject to a number of potential critiques that we now address with additional cross sectional 
and robustness tests. 
4.3 Cross Sectional and Robustness Tests 
4.3.1 Borrower Risk and the Use of Credit Spread 
In the main results, we use credit spread as the proxy for credit risk and reputation. A 
significant concern with this variable is endogeneity. In particular, loan pricing is likely set after 
(or simultaneously with) an agreement between the bank and borrower on financial reporting 
requirements. This simultaneity is a threat to our identification if the borrower’s willingness to 
provide financial statements to the bank on an ongoing basis alters the perception of the 
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borrower’s riskiness.27 To address this concern, we take an alternative approach to identify 
borrower risk level by considering the various loan terms simultaneously. We partition loans 
with features consistent with low-risk and high-risk borrowers based on these loan 
characteristics. Specifically, we classify borrowers that receive above (below)-median maturity, 
fixed (variable) rate loans at a credit spread in the lowest (highest) tercile without (while) posting 
collateral as low (high) risk. Borrowers that do not have loans with all of these features are 
classified as medium-risk. Our logic underlying this grouping approach is that a bank would not 
provide this particular combination of features to a borrower in a loan contract simultaneously 
without also considering the borrower's ex-ante risk (i.e., before considering the provision of 
financial statements).28  
Table 5, Panel A presents the results after partitioning borrowers into these three 
mutually exclusive groups. We continue to find an inverted U-shaped relation between borrower 
risk and financial statement requests; that is, the medium-risk group has the highest level of 
financial statement requests, whereas the low- and high-risk groups have lower financial 
statement request rates. The inverted U-shape also manifests for interim financial statements.  
One concern with our bucketing approach is that, while it is unlikely that the firms in the 
low and high risk buckets are not truly low and high risk, the approach is very restrictive and few 
firms are classified as either low or high risk. Therefore, in Panel B we eliminate the restriction 
related to collateral, resulting in a less restrictive approach with more firms classified as either 
                                                 
27 For example, consider a bank offering a menu of contracts to a borrower that trades off the level of the spread 
with the provision of ongoing financial reporting. In this case, the causal chain is not the bank assessing risk and 
then requesting financial statements; rather, these two outcomes are selected simultaneously. 
28 In other words, we argue that a bank would not give a long maturity, fixed rate, uncollateralized loan at a low 
interest rate if the bank did not consider the borrower to be low-risk ex-ante. Likewise, low-risk borrowers would 
not accept a loan contract that had a short maturity, variable rate, collateralized loan at a high interest rate (only 
high-risk borrowers would do so). 
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low or high risk. Panel B shows that the inverted U-shape maintains.29 In Panel C, columns 1 and 
3 (2 and 4) we regress the indicator variable for the presence of a business (interim) financial 
statement request on indicator variables for the low and high risk buckets and include time fixed 
effects.30 Columns 1 and 2 report the results using the more restrictive bucketing approach (from 
Panel A), while columns 3 and 4 use the less restrictive approach (from Panel B). The 
coefficients on the indicator variables across all specifications are negative, but statistical 
significance is weak for low risk bucket in the restrictive approach.31 Collectively, the results 
from Table 5 should be interpreted with caution because our alternative approach to assessing 
credit risk confronts us with limited degrees of freedom and does not fully address all 
endogeneity issues. However, our approach mitigates concerns that the inverted U-shaped 
relation between financial reporting and borrower risk is explained by a straightforward reverse 
causality story.  
4.3.2 Collateral 
In our main results, we find a positive relation between the presence of collateral and 
requests for interim financial statements. We infer from this finding that financial statements 
help the bank monitor collateral. One potential concern regarding this inference is that the 
positive relation between interim financial statement requests and collateral is the result of 
omitted variable endogeneity. For example, the type of borrower that posts collateral could also 
be more likely to generate interim financial statements for internal use (e.g., if financial 
                                                 
29 We drop the collateral restriction because prior literature suggests ambiguity in the relation between collateral and 
borrower risk: collateral can serve either a screening or signaling role. Nevertheless, to be sure the results are not 
dependent on our choice of classifying variables, in untabulated results we drop each restriction one at a time 
(except for the credit spread) and continue to find an inverted U-shape relation between our alternative risk proxy 
and financial statement requests.  
30 One downside to this simultaneous risk bucketing approach is that few banks or industries have sufficient 
observations across all risk buckets to include either bank or industry fixed effects in these regressions.  
31 In an alternative regression specification in which we include the medium risk indicator and hold out the low and 
high risk indicators—effectively pooling the firms in the tails—we find a significantly positive coefficient on the 
medium risk indicator across all specifications.    
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statements are more likely to be produced for performance measurement purposes when the firm 
has fixed assets), and have a low marginal cost of providing these statements to the bank. 
Borrower type is the unobservable omitted variable and would result in an inappropriate 
inference from the positive relation between collateral and the interim financial statement 
requests. To address this endogeneity concern, we need a variable that is associated with the 
benefit of monitoring a borrower’s collateral, but not the characteristics of the borrower.  
We identify geographic states as either “borrower-friendly” or “lender-friendly” with 
respect to collateral repossession as our source of variation. State laws affect how easily a bank 
can liquidate a borrower and access the collateral, but the differences in these laws across states 
are plausibly exogenous to the characteristics of the borrower. Because we are unable to identify 
an existing index in the literature that categorizes states based on repossession laws, we develop 
one using publicly available measures of state laws and procedures following our discussions 
with legal experts and bankers.32 We implement this approach by coding each state along three 
legal dimensions: (i) whether it requires lenders to go through a court to initiate foreclosure 
(Brown, Ciochetti, and Riddiough [2006]; Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi [2014]), (ii) whether the 
foreclosure process consumes an above-median amount of time, and (iii) whether material 
exceptions to the “peaceful repossession allowable” standard exist. We describe each of these 
laws in section C of the online appendix. We sum these three indicators to create a Recovery 
Barrier composite score that assesses banks’ level of difficulty to repossess collateral in that 
state.33 Finally, we create an indicator variable, Low Recovery Barrier State, that equals 1 for 
                                                 
32 We thank Douglas Baird and Ed Morrison for valuable discussions about our approach. 
33 We do not know the identity of the bank, but we know the bank’s state of location. We assign all of the loans for 
each bank to the bank’s state. Because national banks can lend across state borders, assigning all of a bank’s loans to 
a particular state likely induces noise in our repossession law variable. We examine state-level variation because 
small private firms are much more likely to resolve financial distress through state law procedures than federal 
bankruptcy. Morrison [2009] finds that the vast majority of distressed firms resolve their distress through state law, 
and that fewer than 20% file for petitions under the federal bankruptcy code. 
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states with Recovery Barrier scores below 2 (“lender-friendly”), and 0 otherwise (“borrower-
friendly”).  
Our approach provides useful variation for several reasons.  First, procedural barriers to 
the bank recovering collateral reduce the benefit of (costly) ex-ante monitoring of that collateral; 
that is, these laws essentially make the collateral less liquid or available to the bank ex-post, 
rendering ex-ante tracking of the collateral less worthwhile (e.g., Mian et al. [2014]). Second, the 
initial shareholders in our sample of small firms are unlikely to choose their state of location 
based on the prevailing liquidation laws, and therefore the variation is not directly related to 
borrower type. Third, states vary considerably according to the process through which banks 
must proceed to repossess property, and the length of time this process takes, creating useful 
variation.  
Although our goal in this approach is to develop a measure that broadly captures the 
degree to which a state is borrower or lender-friendly with respect to collateral recovery, there 
are limitations. Two of the three provisions we are able to identify are related to real property; 
however, as we have already shown by investigating differences between C&I and CRE loans, 
banks are more likely to use financial statements to monitor personal property rather than real 
property. Our assumption is that these provisions are still helpful in identifying “borrower-
friendly” from “lender-friendly” states, generally. In the online appendix, we tabulate results 
which show that all three of our Recovery Barrier components are positively correlated with 
each other and that loans in “borrower-friendly” states are less likely to be collateralized. These 
results provide some validation for our assumption and the relevance of our measure (see Tables 
C3 and B7 of the online appendix, respectively). We also have to assume that the repossession 
provisions are uncorrelated with borrower type and financial statement preparation cost—
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assumptions that are more difficult to test, but seem plausible given the varied distribution of 
laws across the states documented in the online appendix. 
We augment equation (1) with the interaction Has Collateral * Low Recovery Barrier 
State, generating a difference-in-difference design:  
 𝐹𝐹/𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 𝑄𝑄𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∗
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 𝑄𝑄𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅2𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝜷𝜷𝟓𝟓 ∗
𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯 𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑯𝑯𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑯𝑯𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒊 + 𝜷𝜷𝟔𝟔 ∗ 𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯 𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑯𝑯𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑯𝑯𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒊 ∗
𝑳𝑳𝑪𝑪𝑳𝑳 𝑹𝑹𝑪𝑪𝑹𝑹𝑪𝑪𝑹𝑹𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑹𝑹 𝑩𝑩𝑯𝑯𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒊𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 𝑺𝑺𝑪𝑪𝑯𝑯𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒊 + 𝛽𝛽7 ∗
𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8 ∗
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽10 ∗
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽11 ∗ 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽12 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽13 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
 
In column 1 of Table 6, we find Has Collateral—the relation between collateral and interim 
financial statement requests for high-barrier states—is statistically insignificant. In other words, 
in states in which collateral is less cost-beneficial to the bank, the extent of financial monitoring 
is unrelated to collateral. By contrast, the sum of β1 and β2, which is the coefficient of the 
relation between collateral and financial statement requests in low repossession barrier states, is 
statistically significant. Therefore, the relation between financial monitoring and collateral is 
strong in easy recovery states, that is, states in which collateral monitoring is more cost 
beneficial. Moreover, the difference-in-difference term (the interaction term on Has Collateral * 
Low Recovery Barrier State) is positive and significant at the 5% level.34 To corroborate this 
finding, we examine whether this relation is stronger when we exclude CRE loans, for which 
interim financial statements are a less beneficial monitoring device relative to C&I loans. 
Column 2 shows this is indeed the case: the coefficient on the interaction is 58% larger and 
                                                 
34 Because we include bank fixed effects, and banks are assigned to only one state, we exclude the main effect for 
Low Recovery Barrier State since we cannot identify its effect separately from the bank level fixed effect. States’ 
legal and procedural barriers to repossession are predominantly constant throughout our sample period, preventing 
us from exploiting changes in these variables. 
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statistically different (p-value .06) than the full sample result of column 1.  
We tabulate several additional robustness checks of the Table 6 result in Table B7 of the 
online appendix. First, we run our main regression in equation (1) on high and low recovery 
barrier state loans separately (i.e., a fully interacted regression with the Low Recovery Barrier 
State variable) and find the positive relation between collateral and interim reporting is only 
present in low recovery barrier states.  This result, combined with the fact that we include 
industry fixed effects, mitigates concerns that unaccounted for differences between high and low 
recovery states (e.g., differing industry concentrations) that may be related to loan 
collateralization are driving the results. Second, we also find the result is not sensitive to 
conditioning only on loans for which banks require some level of reporting (annual or interim 
financial statements). Third, we use our ordered Recovery Barrier composite score instead of the 
Low Recovery Barrier State indicator, and find a negative (though marginally insignificant) 
relation between collateral recovery barriers and interim financial statement requests.  In sum, 
the contrast between high- and low-recovery barrier states suggests the relation between 
collateral and frequent reporting presented in Table 4 reflects the usefulness of financial 
information in monitoring collateral, rather than unobserved borrower characteristics.  
4.3.3 Tax Returns as Alternative Information Sources 
In our main tests, we find banks request financial statements significantly less frequently 
when they request tax returns. This evidence suggests to us that tax returns are substitutes for 
financial statements, in general. In this section, we expand this analysis in two ways. First, we 
measure the level of asset intensity and intangible assets to further examine the substitutability of 
tax returns and financial statements cross-sectionally. Second we examine the hypothesis that tax 
returns and financial statements are complements when information asymmetry is particularly 
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high or monitoring is particularly beneficial. 
Because we do not observe the financial information of the borrowers in our sample, we 
use Compustat to calculate the median level of intangible assets (intangible assets (INTAN) 
scaled by total assets (AT)) and asset intensity (total assets (AT) divided by sales (SALE)) for 
each 3-digit NAICS industry. We then create an indicator variable for each industry to assign it 
to a high (=1) or low (=0) category for both variables based on the median level. We then use the 
subsample of loans in our dataset reporting industry information and classify each borrower 
based on its industry. Our tests use equation (1) but omit industry fixed effects because the 
variables of interest (Intangible Assets and Asset Intensity) are defined at the industry level. 
Table 7, Panel A presents the results. Column 1 (2) reports the conditional relation between 
intangible assets (asset intensity) and financial statement requests. Column 1 (2) shows banks 
make relatively fewer (more) requests for financial statements when the firm is in an industry 
with high levels of intangible assets (asset intensity).  
We then examine the relative usefulness of financial statements and tax returns, 
conditional on asset tangibility. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 examine when banks collect tax 
returns but not financial statements, conditional on some financial information being collected 
(at least one of the two types of reports). Using our industry-based variables for intangible assets 
and asset intensity, we find the opposite sign for both Intangible Assets and Asset Intensity as in 
columns 1 and 2, respectively: banks request tax returns more (less) frequently without financial 
statements when the firm has high intangible assets (asset intensity). These results suggest 
financial information from these borrowers is still important, but also reveal that banks and 
borrowers find tax returns an important alternative when financial reporting is potentially more 
costly. 
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We next expand our tax return analysis by examining whether tax returns serve as 
complementary monitoring mechanisms to firm financial reports when a bank benefits from 
monitoring a borrower more intensively. In comparison with our main set of findings, which 
indicate banks request financial statements less frequently when they request tax returns, this 
hypothesis suggests that for situations in which information asymmetry problems are most 
severe, banks use tax returns in conjunction with financial statements. To find evidence for this 
hypothesis, we examine the circumstances under which the bank requests tax returns and 
financial statements simultaneously. We create an indicator variable that equals 1 if the bank 
requests both a financial statement and a tax return, and 0 if it requests only one or the other (i.e., 
as in columns 3 and 4 of Panel A, the sample is conditional on a request for at least one type of 
statement).  
Table 7, Panel B presents the results. Although the statistical significance is marginal for 
most variables, the table shows that banks are more likely to request a tax return and financial 
statements simultaneously precisely when information asymmetry problems are most salient: 
when the borrower has more than one loan and the bank’s relationship with the borrower is 
shorter, and when the bank is requesting more additional non-financial information. Moreover, 
consistent with the prediction of Diamond [1991] in which monitoring is most cost beneficial for 
middle-tier firms, we find an inverted U-shaped relation between borrower risk and the 
simultaneous request for financial statements and tax returns (i.e., the main effect on Credit 
Spread Quintile is significantly positive, whereas the squared term is significantly negative—and 
the inflection point is 2.9, near the middle of the distribution).35 Taken together, the evidence 
                                                 
35 In results tabulated in Table B8 in the online appendix, we examine the possibility that tax returns have a similar 
inverted U-shaped relation with borrower credit risk. Column 2 shows no economic or statistical pattern exists 
between borrower risk and tax reporting, which is in contrast to financial statements (our original Table 4 column 2 
results for financial reporting are repeated in column 1 to facilitate comparison). This evidence supports our use of 
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from Table 7 suggests that a firm’s tax returns can serve as both substitutes and complements to 
financial statement monitoring, conditional on the information environment.   
5. Conclusion 
We gain access to a proprietary dataset of information requests from banks to borrowers 
after loan origination to examine when banks use financial statements to monitor small 
commercial borrowers. We find financial statements are the most requested item in the dataset; 
however, banks request them from only half of the borrowers. Financial reporting thus exceeds a 
cost-benefit threshold quite frequently, even in a setting in which the average loan size is small 
and financial statements are infrequently audited. This finding also reveals borrowers are able to 
attract financing without continuously providing financial statements to banks.  
We use theoretical frameworks from accounting and banking to understand the observed 
variation in the use of financial statements for monitoring. We find banks most frequently 
request financial statements from firms with middle-tier credit risk, whereas firms with either 
high or low credit risk receive significantly fewer financial statement requests. This finding not 
only provides evidence for the joint hypothesis that the net benefits of monitoring are highest for 
middle-risk borrowers (Diamond [1991]) and that financial statements are useful ex-post 
monitoring devices, but also that the relation between financial statements and borrower risk is 
non-monotonic, a useful consideration for future empirical research. We also find that while 
financial statements are not related to the presence of collateral overall, bank requests for interim 
financial statements are increasing in the presence of collateral. This finding suggests that 
financial statements can serve an important complementary monitoring role in the presence of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Diamond’s (1991) model of costly monitoring to motivate our tests of when banks request financial statements after 
loan origination.  
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collateral. 
We also provide direct evidence on the usefulness of tax returns vis-à-vis financial 
statements in debt contracting for small firms. Even though the IRS mandates the production of 
tax returns for all firms each year, we find that banks request them less often than financial 
statements. Moreover, while our analyses reveal that a firm’s tax returns can substitute for 
financial statements, generally, we find banks are more likely to request both financial 
statements and tax returns when information asymmetry is particularly salient. In other words, 
the implicit government monitoring of tax returns provides a complementary verification channel 
for financial statements, and further suggests that tax returns and financial statements serve 
distinct monitoring roles in this setting. Together, these results contribute novel evidence to our 
understanding of financial reporting in US privately held firms. These findings should be 
relevant to both academics studying the role of financial reporting in lending markets, and to 
standard setters considering changes to financial reporting for privately held firms. 
While our dataset provides unique insights to further our understanding of how banks use 
financial statements to monitor borrowers and our results are robust to alternative specifications, 
the dataset is far from comprehensive in measuring many elements which are likely quite 
important to debt contracting, and monitoring more generally. Thus, it is hard to completely 
mitigate concerns about omitted variables, preventing us from making causal statements. 
Moreover, our results may lack generalizability to settings with larger firms, especially those in 
the public domain where the credit and financial reporting markets are different. We encourage 
future research with more comprehensive datasets and other settings to consider these issues and 
offer further evidence on how banks monitor.   
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
This appendix describes the measurement of each variable used in our study. All data comes from the 
Sageworks Loan Administration platform. 
Variable Description 
Business Financial 
Request 
An indicator equal to 1 if business financial statements are collected from the 
borrower, and 0 otherwise. 
Interim Financial Request An indicator equal to 1 if business financial statements are collected from the 
borrower more than once per year. The indicator equals 0 otherwise, or 
alternatively if business financial statements are only collected annually, 
depending on the test (refer to the table captions). 
Log Relationship Length The natural log of the number of months since the firm's earliest loan with the 
bank was originated.  
Credit Spread The difference between the loan’s interest rate and the US prime rate, measured 
as the rate posted by a majority of top 25 insured U.S.-chartered commercial 
banks, as reported on the Federal Reserve Board of Governors website. We note 
that a few loans have an unreasonably negative credit spread, likely because the 
date for measuring the prime rate and date of the interest rate in the dataset are 
not the same (e.g., the reported interest rates for loans established before the bank 
implemented the SLA system likely have updated interest rates, but we have to 
map prime rates to the date the loan was initiated). We re-assign loans with a 
credit spread of less than -200 bps a credit spread of -200bps. We then add 200 
bps to all loans, such that the minimum credit spread is 0 to ensure Credit Spread 
Squared is monotonically increasing in Credit Spread.  
Multiple Loans An indicator equal to 1 if the firm has more than one loan with the bank, and 0 
otherwise. 
Has Collateral An indicator equal to 1 if the loan is collateralized; 0 otherwise. Note this is 
measured incremental to the CRE Loan indicator, such that CRE loans are only 
considered to have collateral if the loan is secured by assets (e.g., inventory or 
financial investments) beyond the commercial property.  
Business Tax Return 
Request 
An indicator equal to 1 if business tax returns are scheduled to be collected from 
the borrower, and 0 otherwise. 
Log Non-Financial 
Request Count 
The natural log number of non-financial requests the bank makes of the 
borrower, per year. Non-financial requests are those not related to financial 
statements or tax returns such as proof of insurance, information about the 
owner’s personal wealth, and equipment listings. 
Log Loan Amount The natural log of the loan amount. The loan amount has been trimmed at the 1% 
level. 
Log Maturity The natural log of the maturity of the loan. The maturity is measured in months, 
and has been trimmed at the 1% level. 
Variable Rate An indicator equal to 1 if the loan is a Variable Rate loan, and 0 otherwise. 
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Line of Credit An indicator equal to 1 if the maturity of the loan is less than 12 months, and 0 
otherwise. 
CRE Loan An indicator equal to 1 if the loan is a commercial real estate loan, and 0 
otherwise. 
Judicial Procedures State An indicator equal to 1 if the bank is headquartered in a state where it must go 
through a court to initiate a mortgage foreclosure, and 0 otherwise. The judicial 
law process is somewhat more bureaucratic and time consuming than the power-
of-sale process (Brown, Ciochetti, and Riddiough 2006). Data on state laws are 
drawn from the Mortgage Bankers Association website. 
Process Period The length of the foreclosure process in the state of the bank’s headquarters, 
measured in days. Data on state process periods are drawn from 
www.realtytrac.com/foreclosure-laws/foreclosure-laws-comparison.asp If a 
range is provided (e.g., 170-210), the midpoint is used (190). Date of access: 
February 2, 2015. 
Repossession Barrier An indicator equal to 1 if the bank is headquartered in a state with a material 
exception to the “peaceful repossession allowable” standard for collateral. Data 
on state laws are drawn from www.creditinfocenter.com/legal/auto-repossession-
laws.shtml Date of access: February 2, 2015. 
Recovery Barrier 
composite score 
A composite score ranging from 0 to 3 that measures the difficulty of liquidating 
a borrower. The scale works as follows. The score is the sum of the Judicial 
Procedures State and Recovery Barrier indicators, plus an indicator equal to 1 if 
the Process Period is above the median. 
Low Recovery Barriers 
State 
An indicator equal to 1 if the bank is headquartered in a state that has a Recovery 
Barrier composite score less than 2.  
Intangible Assets An indicator equal to 1 if the firm is in an industry that is above the median with 
respect to the ratio of Intangible Assets (INTAN) to Total Assets (AT), using the 
universe of Compustat firms with NAICS codes reported in 2011, and 0 
otherwise. Industry groups are defined at the three-digit NAICS code level. 
Asset Intensity An indicator equal to 1 if the firm is in an industry that is above the median with 
respect to the ratio of Total Assets to Sales, using the universe of Compustat 
firms with NAICS codes reported in 2011, and 0 otherwise. Industry groups are 
defined at the 3-digit NAICS code level. 
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This table presents the sample selection (Panel A) and descriptive statistics (Panel B) for firm-loan observations used in the 
analyses. Business Financials Requested is an indicator equal to one if the bank requests business financial statements. Interim 
Financials Request is an indicator equal to one if business financial statements are collected more than once per year. Only 
observations in which financial statements are requested are considered for this row. Loan term variables excluding indicators are 
truncated at the 1% level. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection
Initial Business Loans 9,290
Eliminate loans from banks with fewer than 10 unique borrowers (141)
Eliminate loans for firms missing loan terms, relationship data, or correspondence data (4,631)
Final Sample 4,518
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Monitoring and Contract Variables
Mean Std Dev 25% 50% 75% N
Business Financial Request 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 4,518
Interim Financial Request 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 2,288
Relationship Length (months) 31.58 39.80 9.60 20.79 40.41 4,518
Interest Rate 6.05 1.18 5.25 6.00 6.75 4,518
Multiple Loans 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 4,518
Has Collateral 0.39 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 4,518
Business Tax Return Request 0.43 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 4,518
Non-Financial Requests 9.94 19.87 0.00 6.00 10.00 4,518
Loan Amount 232,835 354,909 40,100 100,000 250,000 4,518
Maturity (months) 107.68 135.98 10.00 36.00 171.00 4,518
Variable Rate 0.41 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 4,518
Term Loan 0.45 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 4,518
Line of Credit 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 4,518
CRE Loan 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 4,518
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
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This table presents the means for selected variables conditional upon the type of financial report requested by the bank.  See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
  
Panel A: Business Financial Statement Collection
Relationship 
Length 
(months)
Credit 
Spread
Has 
Collateral
# of Non-
Financial 
Requests
Loan 
Amount N
Business Financials not collected 38.42 1.98 0.39 8.88 209,415 2,230
Business Financials collected 24.90 2.02 0.40 10.98 255,662 2,288
Panel B: Business Financial Statement Collection Frequency
Relationship 
Length 
(months)
Credit 
Spread
Has 
Collateral
# of Non-
Financial 
Requests
Loan 
Amount N
Business Financials collected annually 25.32 2.01 0.35 8.57 217,755 1,732
Business Financials collected more often than annually 23.59 2.08 0.56 18.47 373,747 556
Panel C: Business Financial Statement and Business Tax Return Collection
Relationship 
Length 
(months)
Credit 
Spread
Has 
Collateral
# of Non-
Financial 
Requests
Loan 
Amount N
Business Financials and Business Tax Returns collected 23.80 1.96 0.39 12.92 272,886 1,209
Business Financials collected, but not Business Tax Returns 26.13 2.09 0.42 8.81 236,363 1,079
Business Tax Returns collected, but not Business Financials 27.52 1.71 0.42 4.96 238,045 728
Neither Business Financials nor Business Tax Returns collected 43.71 2.11 0.37 10.78 195,538 1,502
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Financial Report Type
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This table presents the means for various variables partitioned by quintile of credit spread (Panel A) and relationship length (Panel B). See Appendix A for 
variable definitions. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics by Credit Spread Quintile
Credit Spread Quintile 1 0.45 0.16 59.21 5.26 0.33 10.31 321,903
Credit Spread Quintile 2 0.54 0.30 27.36 5.42 0.41 9.41 293,953
Credit Spread Quintile 3 0.57 0.36 22.48 5.90 0.35 10.98 218,220
Credit Spread Quintile 4 0.51 0.19 23.94 6.33 0.47 9.90 199,457
Credit Spread Quintile 5 0.46 0.14 24.83 7.39 0.41 8.97 125,840
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics by Relationship Length Quintile
Relationship Length Quintile 1 0.59 0.17 3.70 5.90 0.39 12.71 224,269
Relationship Length Quintile 2 0.59 0.22 11.25 6.01 0.44 9.78 212,285
Relationship Length Quintile 3 0.55 0.39 20.70 6.08 0.41 8.81 253,015
Relationship Length Quintile 4 0.45 0.27 35.40 6.20 0.42 8.60 227,143
Relationship Length Quintile 5 0.35 0.14 87.02 6.05 0.31 9.81 247,508
Non Financial 
Requests
Relationship 
Length
Table 3: Conditional Descriptive Statistics
Loan 
Amount
Interest 
Rate
Has 
Collateral
Business 
Financial 
Requested
Interim 
Financial 
Request
Loan 
Amount
Interest 
Rate
Has 
Collateral
Business 
Financial 
Requested
Interim 
Financial 
Request
Non Financial 
Requests
Relationship 
Length
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Relationship Length -0.041*** -0.029** -0.035*** -0.007 -0.018
[-2.94] [-2.52] [-2.98] [-0.93] [-1.15]
Credit Spread Quintile 0.101*** 0.055* 0.055* 0.058*** 0.067**
[2.74] [1.76] [1.77] [3.49] [2.24]
Credit Spread Quintile2 -0.015*** -0.008* -0.009* -0.010*** -0.011**
[-2.67] [-1.75] [-1.80] [-3.82] [-2.39]
Multiple Loans 0.073*** 0.046*** 0.049*** 0.014 0.038**
[3.51] [2.66] [2.88] [1.30] [2.17]
Has Collateral -0.053*** -0.016 -0.011 0.043*** 0.048**
[-2.74] [-0.88] [-0.64] [3.16] [2.17]
Business Tax Return Request -0.090*** 0.018 0.001
[-3.50] [1.27] [0.03]
Log Non-Financial Requests -0.079*** -0.023** -0.026*** 0.040*** 0.064***
[-9.06] [-2.47] [-2.75] [5.28] [7.46]
Log Loan Amount 0.048*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.030*** 0.045***
[6.26] [5.76] [5.80] [6.95] [6.13]
Log Maturity 0.002 -0.015* -0.015* -0.006* -0.010
[0.20] [-1.86] [-1.85] [-1.73] [-1.54]
Variable Rate 0.031 0.012 0.018 0.044*** 0.051**
[1.56] [0.61] [0.91] [3.59] [2.37]
Line of Credit 0.005 -0.018 -0.017 -0.016 -0.038
[0.15] [-0.66] [-0.65] [-1.03] [-1.24]
CRE Loan 0.015 -0.094*** -0.091*** -0.103*** -0.174***
[0.63] [-3.18] [-3.15] [-4.82] [-4.66]
Fixed Effects Time Time, Bank, Industry Time, Bank, Industry Time, Bank, Industry Time, Bank, Industry
N 4,518 4,518 4,518 4,518 2,288
adj. R-sq 0.073 0.408 0.413 0.524 0.568
Sample All All All All Conditional on 
requesting F/S
Table 4: Determinants of Financial Statement Requests
Business Financial 
Request
Business Financial 
Request
Business Financial 
Request
Interim Financial 
Request
Interim Financial 
Request
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This table presents OLS regressions of financial statement requests on relationship length, tax reporting, non-financial monitoring, loan characteristics, and time, 
bank, and industry fixed effects. The dependent variable in the first three columns is an indicator equal to 1 if business financial statements are requested by the 
bank, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in the fourth column is an indicator equal to 1 if business financial statements are requested more often than once 
per year, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in the fifth column is an indicator equal to 1 if business financial statements are requested more often than once 
per year, and 0 if business financial statements are produced only annually. Thus, the sample in the fifth column is restricted to loans where financial statements 
are requested. See Appendix A for variable definitions. Reported below the coefficients are t-statistics clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance 
at the two-tailed 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
48 
 
  
 
  
This table presents the frequency of financial statement requests conditional on our estimated risk of the loan. In Panel 
A, we assign firms to low (high) risk categories when their loans have long (short) maturity, fixed (variable) rates, low 
(high) credit spreads, and no (having) collateral, and remaining firms to the medium risk category.  In Panel B, the 
assignment is the same as Panel A, except we drop the restriction related to collateral. Reported in the cells are the 
frequency of financial statement requests and the number of borrowers classified into each risk bucket. In Panel C, we 
report the results of OLS regressions of the level of financial monitoring on an indicator for whether the firm is assigned 
as a low or high risk. In columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4), we use the assignments from Panel A (B). Reported below the 
coefficients are t-statistics clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
Business Financial Interim Financial 
Request Request N
Low Risk 42.5% 9.6% 167
Medium Risk 51.2% 12.5% 4,321
High Risk 10.0% 0.0% 30
Business Financial Interim Financial 
Request Request N
Low Risk 41.3% 7.2% 334
Medium Risk 51.8% 12.9% 4,088
High Risk 34.4% 5.2% 96
Table 5: Financial Statement Requests and Alternative Risk Measures
Panel A: Univariate Analysis of Financial Requests Using Risk Buckets
Panel B: Univariate Analysis of Financial Requests Using Risk Buckets, Less Restrictive Classification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low Risk -0.066 -0.012 -0.086** -0.041*
[-1.40] [-0.39] [-2.40] [-1.95]
High Risk -0.425*** -0.135*** -0.182*** -0.083***
[-7.56] [-16.91] [-3.51] [-3.50]
Fixed Effects Time Time Time Time
N 4,518 4,518 4,518 4,518
adj. R-sq 0.008 0.005 0.007 0.007
Business Financial 
Request
Panel C: Regression Analysis of Financial Statement Requests on Risk Buckets
Business Financial 
Request
Interim Financial 
Request
Business Financial 
Request
Using Panel A Classification Using Panel B Classification
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This table presents OLS regressions of the level of financial monitoring on the presence of relationship 
characteristics, tax reporting, non-financial monitoring, loan characteristics, and time, bank, and industry fixed 
effects. High (Low) Recovery Barrier states are those with Recovery Barrier composite scores of two or three (zero 
or one). Column 2 restricts the sample to C&I loans. See Appendix A for variable definitions. Reported below the 
coefficients are t-statistics clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. 
(1) (2)
Interim Financial Interim Financial
Request Request
Has Collateral 0.011 0.002
[0.58] [0.08]
Has Collateral * Low Recovery Barrier State 0.073** 0.115***
[2.45] [3.00]
0.084*** 0.117***
13.36 13.02
Control Variables? Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Time, Bank, Industry Time, Bank, Industry
N 4,062 2,820
adj. R-sq 0.529 0.548
Sample All C&I Loans Only
β1 + β2
F-test
Table 6: State Repossession Laws and Interim Financial Statement Requests
β1
β2
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This table presents OLS regressions of the mix of requests on relationship characteristics, non-financial monitoring, loan 
characteristics, and time and bank fixed effects.  In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable in each column is an indicator equal 
to one if business financial statements are requested by the bank, and zero otherwise. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable 
in each column is an indicator equal to one if business tax returns are requested by the bank but business financial statements are 
not, and zero otherwise.  The sample in all columns is restricted to loans not missing an industry code. The sample in columns 3 
and 4 is further restricted to loans where either a financial statement or tax return is requested. Intangible Assets and Asset 
Intensity are indicator variables equal to one if the firm is in an industry that is above the median with respect to those 
characteristics using the universe of Compustat firms in 2011 with NAICS codes, and zero otherwise. Industry groups are defined 
at the three-digit NAICS code level.  See Appendix A for variable definitions. Reported below the coefficients are t-statistics 
clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Industry Charactertistics and Financial Statement and Tax Return Requests
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tax Return but Tax Return but 
not F/S Requested not F/S Requested
Intangible Assets -0.066** 0.096***
[-2.21] [2.60]
Asset Intensity 0.059** -0.091**
[2.10] [-2.52]
Control Variables? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Time, Bank Time, Bank Time, Bank Time, Bank
N 1,863 1,863 1,225 1,225
adj. R-sq 0.393 0.392 0.258 0.257
Sample All All Conditional on 
requesting either a 
F/S or a tax return
Conditional on 
requesting either a 
F/S or a tax return
Business Financial 
Request
Business Financial 
Request
Table 7: The Role of Tax Returns as an Alternative Information Source
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This table presents OLS regressions of the level of financial and tax reporting on relationship 
characteristics, non-financial monitoring, loan characteristics, and time, bank, and industry 
fixed effects.  The dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if both business financial 
statements and business tax returns are requested by the bank, and zero if only one of these 
documents is requested.  The sample is restricted to loans where either a financial statement 
or tax return is requested. See Appendix A for variable definitions. Reported below the 
coefficients are t-statistics clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
two-tailed 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel B: Verification Role of Tax Returns
(1)
Bus Financials and
Tax Return Requested
Log Relationship Length -0.029*
[-1.85]
Credit Spread Quintile 0.071*
[1.67]
Credit Spread Quintile2 -0.012*
[-1.82]
Multiple Loans 0.040*
[1.74]
Has Collateral 0.051**
[2.10]
Log Non-Financial Requests 0.018*
[1.74]
Log Loan Amount 0.025***
[3.00]
Log Maturity -0.004
[-0.42]
Variable Rate 0.053**
[2.16]
Line of Credit -0.020
[-0.58]
CRE Loan -0.067*
[-1.80]
Fixed Effects Time, Bank, Industry
N 3,016
adj. R-sq 0.363
Sample Conditional on requesting 
either a F/S or a tax return
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Section A. Setting and Dataset Description 
A1. Setting 
Small commercial firms in the United States rely heavily on banks for financing, and prior 
literature describes a lending framework for this setting that has three dimensions: loan types, 
borrowing purposes, and lending mechanisms. The loan types and borrowing purposes are very 
similar to those for public firms. Two primary types of loans exist: commercial and industrial 
(C&I) and commercial real estate (CRE). C&I loans include lines of credit to address seasonality 
and working capital financing and term loans for equipment and general business financing. The 
former generally have maturities of less than one year, whereas the latter have maturities greater 
than one year. CRE loans are typically long-term mortgages to purchase buildings and land. 
Lending mechanisms are the technologies used to mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems associated with making and monitoring loans. The common lending mechanisms, 
including financial statements, collateral, and relationships, are also similar for public firms, but 
with less emphasis on financial reporting.  
Multiple banking literature surveys (e.g., Gup and Kolari [2005], Berger and Udell [2006], 
Freixas and Rochet [2008], and Degryse, Kim, and Ongena [2009]) as well as regulator 
documents (e.g., OCC [2001]) portray broad heterogeneity in the combinations of loan types, 
borrowing purposes, and lending mechanisms in this setting. In other words, no one loan 
mechanism is used exclusively for any one loan type. For example, lines of credit are generally 
assumed to be collateralized by working capital assets, but this is not necessarily the reality; by 
definition, CRE loans are collateralized by real estate assets, but other assets can cross-
collateralize these loans; term loans can be used to purchase equipment, but can also be financed 
based on the firm’s cash flows (i.e., uncollateralized). Similar to collateral, relationship and 
financial reporting mechanisms can be used across all loan types. A key conclusion of Berger 
and Udell [2006] is that banks and borrowers consider a combination of all these mechanisms 
across loan types.   
A2. Dataset description 
Sageworks, Inc. graciously provided us proprietary data from the Sageworks Loan 
Administration (SLA) package for the purposes of examining the monitoring of small 
commercial firms.1 SLA is an online cloud based tool that allows banks to record and track 
details about each loan. From the bank’s perspective, SLA automates the collection of borrower 
information and facilitates the loan review process. In addition to providing these organizing 
features, SLA is a compliance tool facilitating a bank’s regulatory review process. Regulators 
require banks to maintain risk assessment and monitoring practices. For example, the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency states that risk management practices should “form the 
foundation for credit risk measurement, monitoring, and reporting, and it should support 
management’s and the board’s decision making” [OCC 2001]. The SLA system provides data to 
guide the bank’s credit measurement and monitoring activities across the portfolio of loans, and 
provides documentation necessary for banks to prove compliance with stated practices to 
regulators. 
                                                          
1 This product was formerly called “Sageworks Monitor.” See http://web.sageworks.com/loan-administration/ for 
additional information about the product. 
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From the econometrician’s perspective, SLA contains the set of ongoing financial and non-
financial reporting requirements that the bank and borrower agree to in the form of a collection 
schedule. Because SLA is an ex ante scheduling program, we observe a static “snapshot” of the 
information each bank requests from each borrower, and this information does not vary over the 
life of the loan.  Thus, although we have historical data in the sense of when the loans were 
originated, we do not have a dynamic panel of loans or information requests. We also do not 
observe loan outcomes such as delinquencies and defaults, preventing us from investigating how 
monitoring activities are associated with loan performance. We received the dataset in two 
separate files: a loan file (with anonymized bank, borrower, and loan identifiers and terms of the 
loan) and a correspondence file (with anonymized bank and borrower identifiers and all 
information request activity).  
To demonstrate the nature of the data, we present an illustrative loan in Figure A1 below. Most 
variables require little explanation beyond the definitions provided in Appendix A of the paper; 
however the “document name,” “collateral description,” and “risk rating” fields require 
additional discussion. These fields are free-form text, meaning SLA users are allowed discretion 
over what (if any) information to input into the dataset. This discretion results in frequently 
missing observations or textual inputs that are likely informative to the banker, but difficult for 
us to decipher (e.g., the use of acronyms or identification numbers). The “document name” field 
(which is the primary focus of our paper and the main reason for the initial creation of SLA) has 
the fewest issues. Most document requests are sufficiently descriptive (and often standardized, 
such as “business financial statements” or “business tax returns”) that our manual coding process 
is more effective. Table B1 below reports the various documents that we identified and placed 
into broad categories.  
The “collateral description” field is more frequently missing (44% of the collateralized loans 
have no description) and has much more varied inputs compared to the document requests field. 
We identify 1,725 different descriptions of collateral, many of which are indecipherable or 
contain multiple asset types. As a result, we do not use the collateral description field to conduct 
cross sectional tests across collateral types, though we believe this area is a fruitful one for future 
research with more complete data.2 
Finally, the dataset includes a free form risk rating field. As part of the credit allocation and risk 
management process, regulators expect banks to assign risk ratings to loan applicants. One might 
suggest this variable would be a useful proxy for a borrower’s credit reputation instead of the 
credit spread variable we use in the paper; however, this variable has a number of theoretical and 
empirical issues. Discussions with bankers suggest this variable does not fully capture credit 
reputation as well as credit spread. Typically, the risk rating is assigned based on a loan’s 
                                                          
2 In Table B2 we conduct a robustness test in which we explicitly control for collateral in the form of guarantees. 
For example, we find SBA guarantees in 5.7% of sample loans, which is similar to the overall rate of 5.2% of US 
loans (Dilger [2013]). A potential concern one might have surrounding loans with SBA guarantees is that the 
program distorts lenders’ incentives to monitor. Several factors mitigate the importance of this concern to our study, 
however. First, as indicated by the 5.2% statistic, loans originated under SBA programs comprise a very small 
fraction of overall C&I loans outstanding. Second, even in the presence of an SBA guarantee, lenders have 
incentives to monitor borrowers because not doing so threatens future participation in the program. Moreover, 
lenders incur the first losses on SBA loans, and the government only reimburses them for losses up to a maximum 
percentage per the SBA guarantee. Because the collateral description field is noisy, the guarantor indicator variable 
used in Table B2 is also noisy, and we suggest future research investigate the different types of collateral.  
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perceived risk based on generic features such as loan type and borrower industry. The credit 
spread takes this rating into account, but then the bank adjusts the spread based on the 
borrower’s specific credit reputation and ability to attract financing from other banks based on 
that reputation. Therefore, the spread identifies this additional component of credit reputation 
missing in the risk rating. Moreover, risk rating does not mitigate endogeneity concerns. Like the 
credit spread, the risk rating is assigned after consideration of other loan contract terms (such as 
collateral, financial statement provision, etc.). Thus, as a theoretical construct, the risk rating 
misses an element of borrower reputation and does not resolve endogeneity issues.  
The variable also suffers from empirical issues. First, it is missing for 31% of loans in the 
dataset. Second, no consistent ratings systems exist across (or, even in some cases, within) 
banks. Therefore, empirically inferring the direction and magnitude of the rating is difficult. 
Finally, bankers suggested to us that little usable variation might exist in this variable. Bankers 
first discern whether a borrower is “lendable” and then assign a middle-of-the-road rating to the 
borrower and do not expend much effort in finely partitioning the variable. This bears out in the 
data—despite having inconsistent rating systems across banks, more than half of the loans for 
which there is a risk rating have a rating of “3” in the dataset. On a 10 point rating scale that we 
gained access to from one bank, this number indicates a rather generic imperfect lendable loan.  
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Figure A1: Illustrative Loan 
This figure presents an illustrative loan from the SLA dataset. This figure is an “idealized” loan because all data fields in this illustration are 
completed with decipherable information. In the actual dataset provided to us, fields often have missing data or, because the fields are free 
form allowing bankers to input open-ended text, have text that we are unable to specifically decipher. The Collateral Description and Risk 
Rating fields most frequently have this issue. 
  
 
 
 
 
Loan Terms
Bank Identifier ****0517
Borrower Identifier ****7245
NAICS 112320
Loan Identifier ****4185
Loan Type Code 4 (C&I)
Origination Date 9/1/2009
Interest Rate 5.15%
Collateral Yes
Collateral Description missing
Loan Amount $220,000
Maturity 48 months
Variable Rate? No
Risk Rating 4
Correspondence Record
Bank Identifier Borrower Identifier Correspondence Date Due Date Received Date Document Name Channel Request Type
****0517 ****7245 3/1/2013 4/15/2013 4/25/2013 Annual financial statements Email Initial Request
****0517 ****7245 4/20/2013 4/15/2013 4/25/2013 Annual financial statements Email Past Due
****0517 ****7245 4/20/2013 4/15/2013 4/25/2013 Annual financial statements Letter Past Due
****0517 ****7245 4/1/2013 5/1/2013 5/31/2013 Business tax return Email Initial Request
****0517 ****7245 5/15/2013 5/1/2013 5/31/2013 Business tax return Phone Past Due
****0517 ****7245 5/15/2013 5/1/2013 5/31/2013 Business tax return Email Past Due
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Section B. Descriptive Statistics and Robustness Tests 
Table B1: Correspondence Summary 
This table tabulates the document requests that banks make to borrowers after a loan has been originated. To create this table, we manually coded 697 
unique document requests into the broad categories presented in column 1. Column 2 provides examples of the requests within each category. Column 3 
reports the percentage of loans with a given request type category. Business financial statements are the most commonly requested documents, followed by 
business tax returns, insurance documents, and owner personal information. Columns 4 and 5 partition the sample by loan type. The document requests for 
C&I loans (column 4) and CRE loans (column 5) are generally similar. Banks request insurance documents at a slightly higher rate for C&I loans, whereas 
banks request tax returns, other financial information, and appraisal reports slightly more frequently for CRE loans.    
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All
Request Type Description % Loans % C&I Loans % CRE Loans
Business Financial Statement Business financial statements 50.6% 50.1% 51.7%
Business Tax Return Business tax return 42.9% 41.9% 44.9%
Insurance Hazard, title, or other insurance 36.2% 37.6% 33.3%
Personal Information Personal tax returns or personal financial statements 24.2% 23.3% 26.1%
Other Financial Information Financial information other than complete financial statements
such as receivables aging, budgets, equipment listings
15.1% 13.4% 18.9%
Contingent Rights Records ensuring bank's position in default, such as lien
perfections or UCC filings
11.9% 11.6% 12.4%
Documentation Records such as deeds, vehicle titles, and property titles 5.2% 4.8% 6.3%
Appraisal Appraisal or inspection report 1.9% 0.4% 5.0%
Consent Approval documents with such names as "approval authority" or 
"borrowing authorization" 
1.1% 1.3% 0.7%
Guarantor Records acknowledging guaranty 0.4% 0.4% 0.4%
Compliance Records demonstrating compliance with borrowing agreement 0.2% 0.4% 0.0%
Conditional on type
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Table B2: Determinants of Financial Statement Requests: Specification Robustness 
This table provides a robustness analysis of our results examining the determinants of financial statement requests 
in Table 4 of the paper. Column 1 uses a logit specification. Column 2 uses a continuous measure of the credit 
spread instead of a quintiled version. Column 3 limits the sample to loans not missing an industry code. Columns 
4 and 5 include a variable to control for the presence of a guarantor on the loan. The dependent variable for 
columns 1-4 and 5 are Business Financial Requests and Interim Financial Requests, respectively. See the 
Appendix A in the paper for variable definitions. Reported below the coefficients are t-statistics calculated with 
standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Relationship Length -0.131** -0.036*** -0.057*** -0.034*** -0.008
[-2.23] [-3.04] [-3.14] [-2.89] [-1.09]
Credit Spread Quintile 0.455*** 0.059 0.063** 0.048***
[2.87] [1.24] [2.05] [3.02]
Credit Spread Quintile2 -0.067*** -0.009 -0.010** -0.008***
[-2.71] [-1.21] [-2.14] [-3.33]
Credit Spread 0.026**
[2.27]
Credit Spread2 -0.004**
[-2.19]
Multiple Loans 0.268*** 0.049*** 0.059** 0.049*** 0.014
[2.92] [2.85] [2.27] [2.87] [1.32]
Has Collateral -0.198** -0.012 -0.011 0.002 0.026**
[-2.30] [-0.68] [-0.41] [0.12] [2.00]
Business Tax Return Request 0.678*** -0.090*** -0.092** -0.083*** 0.009
[7.09] [-3.49] [-2.23] [-3.19] [0.61]
Log Non-Financial Requests -0.312*** -0.026*** -0.003 -0.028*** 0.042***
[-8.13] [-2.79] [-0.21] [-2.96] [5.58]
Log Loan Amount 0.191*** 0.039*** 0.028*** 0.038*** 0.030***
[5.65] [5.89] [2.80] [5.81] [7.00]
Log Maturity -0.017 -0.014* -0.023** -0.014* -0.007*
[-0.48] [-1.84] [-2.00] [-1.82] [-1.83]
Variable Rate 0.031 0.020 -0.016 0.023 0.038***
[0.35] [1.04] [-0.56] [1.20] [3.20]
Line of Credit -0.038 -0.016 0.001 -0.017 -0.016
[-0.28] [-0.62] [0.02] [-0.66] [-1.02]
CRE Loan 0.027 -0.092*** -0.015 -0.096*** -0.096***
[0.26] [-3.17] [-0.46] [-3.33] [-4.72]
Guarantor -0.105*** 0.129***
[-2.82] [4.24]
Specification Logit OLS OLS OLS OLS
Fixed Effects Time Time, Bank, 
Industry
Time, Bank, 
Industry
Time, Bank, 
Industry
Time, Bank, 
Industry
N 4,518 4,518 1,964 4,518 4,518
adj. R-sq 0.413 0.419 0.415 0.530
Sample All All Loans not missing All All
Industry code
Interim Financial 
Request
Business Financial 
Request
Business Financial 
Request
Business Financial 
Request
Business Financial 
Request
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Table B3: Determinants of Financial Statement Requests: Sample Robustness 
This table provides robustness analysis of our Table 4 results examining the determinants of financial statement 
requests. Column 1 excludes observations from two banks in our main analyses that do not collect information for 
the majority of their loans. Column 2 also excludes observations from these two banks, but includes loans from 
other banks with no correspondence, which we excluded from our main analyses. Column 3 includes loans 
missing correspondence from all banks. See Appendix A in the paper for variable definitions. Reported below the 
coefficients are t-statistics calculated with standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Log Relationship Length -0.033*** -0.036*** -0.026***
[-2.78] [-3.10] [-2.67]
Credit Spread Quintile 0.057* 0.064** 0.039
[1.81] [2.06] [1.52]
Credit Spread Quintile2 -0.009* -0.009* -0.006
[-1.90] [-1.96] [-1.56]
Multiple Loans 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.033**
[2.69] [2.80] [2.17]
Has Collateral -0.012 -0.024 -0.028
[-0.65] [-1.35] [-1.58]
Business Tax Return Request -0.089*** -0.084*** 0.005
[-3.42] [-3.27] [0.21]
Log Non-Financial Requests -0.012 -0.026*** 0.018**
[-1.37] [-2.74] [2.26]
Log Loan Amount 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.034***
[5.23] [5.84] [5.65]
Log Maturity -0.025*** -0.020** -0.024***
[-2.62] [-2.23] [-2.86]
Variable Rate 0.020 0.022 0.024
[1.05] [1.19] [1.38]
Line of Credit -0.048* -0.034 -0.043*
[-1.71] [-1.26] [-1.73]
CRE Loan -0.093*** -0.083*** -0.059**
[-3.23] [-2.97] [-2.40]
Fixed Effects Time, Bank, Industry Time, Bank, Industry Time, Bank, Industry
N 4,291 4,624 5,473
adj. R-sq 0.407 0.414 0.431
Sample Excluding two banks Excluding two banks Include all loans with
with data issues with data issues, but no info requests
include all other loans
with no info request
Business Financial 
Request
Business Financial 
Request
Business Financial 
Request
8 
 
Table B4: Univariate Correlations 
This table provides the Pearson correlations for the variables used in our analysis. Correlations with Interim Financial Request are conditional on business 
financial statements being requested at least annually. This table includes 4,518 observations. See Appendix A in the paper for variable definitions. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
(1) Business Financial Request
(2) Interim Financial Request
(3) Log Relationship Length -0.10 -0.08
(4) Credit Spread 0.01 0.02 -0.30
(5) Multiple Loans 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.10
(6) Has Collateral 0.02 0.19 -0.08 0.07 -0.10
(7) Business Tax Return Request 0.20 0.21 -0.12 -0.06 0.04 0.01
(8) Log Non-Financial Requests -0.21 0.08 0.13 0.00 0.13 -0.21 -0.13
(9) Log Loan Amount 0.13 0.25 0.01 -0.24 -0.11 0.16 0.12 -0.06
(10) Log Maturity 0.04 0.27 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 0.24 0.13 -0.13 0.17
(11) Variable Rate 0.05 0.29 0.02 -0.25 -0.09 0.06 0.19 -0.06 0.18 0.20
(12) Line of Credit -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 0.03 -0.18 -0.04 0.04 -0.12 -0.71 0.00
(13) CRE Loan 0.01 -0.34 0.15 -0.11 -0.06 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.17 0.15 -0.03
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Table B5: Financial Statement Requests by Industry 
This table summarizes the business financial and tax return request rates by 2-digit NAICS industry. The industry field is reported for 1,954 observations 
and missing for the remaining 2,554 observations.   
 
 
NAICS Business Financial Tax Return
(two digit) Industry Request Request N
11 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 86% 47% 181
21 Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction 67% 22% 12
22 Utilities 100% 50% 4
23 Construction 45% 75% 197
31 Manufacturing- Food and Apparel 7% 41% 15
32 Manufacturing- Chemical 51% 40% 39
33 Manufacturing- Machinery and Metal 32% 41% 28
42 Wholesale Trade 38% 39% 74
44 Retail Trade- Speciality Stores 49% 35% 145
45 Retail Trade- General Merchandise 46% 39% 28
48 Transportation 32% 43% 53
49 Warehousing 0% 64% 2
51 Information 25% 0% 4
52 Finance and Insurance 40% 25% 50
53 Real Estate 55% 24% 614
54 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 40% 43% 78
55 Management of Companies and Enterprises 83% 37% 6
56 Administrative and Other Services 21% 100% 42
61 Educational Services 50% 24% 12
62 Health Care and Social Assistance 43% 25% 97
63 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 50% 34% 22
65 Accommodation and Food Services 33% 0% 120
Other 47% 100% 141
Missing industry code 51% 23% 2,554
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Table B6: Determinants of Financial Statement Requests by Loan Type 
This table reports our Table 4 results examining the determinants of financial statement requests after partitioning the sample by loan type. Columns 1 and 
2 (3 and 4) restrict the sample to C&I (CRE) loans. See Appendix A in the paper for variable definitions. Reported below the coefficients are t-statistics 
calculated with standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Relationship Length -0.017 -0.022** -0.073*** 0.004
[-1.27] [-2.12] [-3.06] [0.72]
Credit Spread Quintile 0.004 0.060*** 0.076 -0.005
[0.12] [2.60] [1.42] [-0.36]
Credit Spread Quintile2 -0.003 -0.011*** -0.008 0.002
[-0.54] [-3.13] [-0.94] [0.67]
Multiple Loans 0.037* 0.017 0.076** 0.009
[1.86] [1.29] [2.45] [1.05]
Has Collateral -0.007 0.045*** -0.014 0.015
[-0.33] [2.65] [-0.39] [0.82]
Business Tax Return Request -0.061** 0.050*** -0.132*** -0.013
[-2.07] [2.58] [-2.70] [-1.12]
Log Non-Financial Requests -0.026** 0.053*** -0.026 0.005
[-2.43] [5.78] [-1.36] [0.61]
Log Loan Amount 0.044*** 0.036*** 0.023* 0.003
[5.65] [6.71] [1.89] [0.63]
Log Maturity -0.004 -0.014** -0.014 0.000
[-0.40] [-2.17] [-1.28] [-0.08]
Variable Rate 0.013 0.048*** -0.032 -0.004
[0.62] [3.42] [-0.81] [-0.28]
Line of Credit 0.005 -0.035*
[0.15] [-1.85]
Fixed Effects Time, Bank, 
Industry
Time, Bank, 
Industry
Time, Bank, 
Industry
Time, Bank, 
Industry
N 3,099 3,099 1,419 1,419
adj. R-sq 0.434 0.542 0.404 0.285
Sample C&I Loans Only C&I Loans Only CRE Loans Only CRE Loans Only
Business Financial 
Request
Interim Financial 
Request
Business Financial 
Request
Interim Financial 
Request
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Table B7: State Repossession Laws and Interim Financial Statement Requests 
This table provides robustness analysis of our Table 6 results examining the relation between interim financial requests and collateral. Panel A reports the 
frequency of loan collateralization partitioned by states with high and low Recovery Barrier Score. Consistent with the hypothesis that recovery barriers 
reduce the value of collateral, this table shows that loans in high recovery barrier states are less frequently collateralized. One may be concerned that the 
higher reported collateral rates in the low recovery barrier states may be a result of higher collateral reporting rates in the database (rather than higher 
collateralization). That is, banks located in states in which collateral is more valuable may be more concerned about tracking the collateral. This concern is 
not an issue for our results because our coefficient of interest is a diff-in-diff coefficient (i.e., the difference in interim financial reporting requests for 
collateralized relative to uncollateralized loans across low versus high recovery barrier states). Moreover, Panel B presents the results after conditioning 
the sample on various partitions. Column 1 (2) limits the sample to loans in low (high) recovery barrier states. Column 3 (4) limits the sample to loans with 
collateral in low (high) recovery barrier states. Column 5 interacts the Has Collateral variable with the Recovery Barrier Score (high scores imply greater 
barriers to recovering collateral in default). See Appendix A in the paper for variable definitions. Reported below the coefficients are t-statistics calculated 
with standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
Panel A 
 
 
Panel B 
 
  
High Low Diff
HasCollateral 26% 62% 37%***
Recovery Barrier
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Has Collateral 0.071*** 0.006 0.088*** -0.020 0.076***
[3.02] [0.31] [2.97] [-0.61] [3.22]
Has Collateral * Recovery Barrier Score -0.023
[-1.53]
Fixed Effects Time, Bank, Industry Time, Bank, Industry Time, Bank, Industry Time, Bank, Industry Time, Bank, Industry
N 1,361 2,701 965 1,149 4,062
adj. R-sq 0.610 0.225 0.635 0.353 0.529
States Low recovery barrier High recovery barrier Low recovery barrier High recovery barrier All
Loans All All
Conditional on 
requesting F/S
Conditional on 
requesting F/S All
Interim Financial 
Request
Interim Financial 
Request
Interim Financial 
Request
Interim Financial 
Request
Interim Financial 
Request
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Table B8: Determinants of Financial Statement, Tax Return, and Non-Financial Information Requests 
This table uses our main specification (equation 1 in the paper) to examine the determinants of different types of information requests. Column 1 repeats 
our main results for business financial requests to facilitate comparison. The dependent variable in column 2 is an indicator for whether the bank requests a 
tax return, and column 3 provides the p-value for differences in the coefficients in columns 1 and 2. The dependent variable in column 4 is a score 
measuring the scope of reporting to the bank. The Reporting Score equals 3 when the bank requests both financial statements and tax returns, 2 when it 
requests only financial statements, 1 when it requests only tax returns, and 0 when it requests neither financial statements nor tax returns. The dependent 
variable in column 5 is the log number of non-financial requests. See Appendix A in the paper for variable definitions. Reported below the coefficients are 
t-statistics calculated with standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1)-(2) difference
(p-value)
Log Relationship Length -0.029** -0.065*** -0.124*** -0.055*
[-2.52] [-5.70] 0.021 [-4.62] [-1.72]
Credit Spread Quintile 0.055* 0.006 0.115* 0.008
[1.76] [0.19] 0.268 [1.66] [0.10]
Credit Spread Quintile2 -0.008* -0.003 -0.019* 0.004
[-1.75] [-0.55] 0.397 [-1.83] [0.37]
Multiple Loans 0.046*** 0.039** 0.131*** 0.334***
[2.66] [2.19] 0.794 [3.55] [7.24]
Has Collateral -0.016 0.051*** 0.019 0.009
[-0.88] [2.68] 0.018 [0.52] [0.19]
Business Tax Return Request -0.208***
[-3.47]
Log Non-Financial Requests -0.023** -0.031*** -0.077***                
[-2.47] [-3.49] 0.569 [-3.77]                
Log Loan Amount 0.038*** 0.002 0.079*** 0.050***
[5.76] [0.36] 0.000 [5.49] [2.63]
Log Maturity -0.015* 0.000 -0.029* 0.002
[-1.86] [-0.06] 0.182 [-1.68] [0.12]
Variable Rate 0.012 0.064*** 0.088** -0.091*
[0.61] [3.35] 0.070 [2.14] [-1.82]
Line of Credit -0.018 0.004 -0.031 0.009
[-0.66] [0.17] 0.569 [-0.55] [0.13]
CRE Loan -0.094*** 0.032 -0.156*** 0.020
[-3.18] [1.24] 0.004 [-2.74] [0.28]
Fixed Effects Time, Bank, Industry Time, Bank, Industry Time, Bank, Industry Time, Bank, Industry
N 4,518 4,518 4,518 4,518
adj. R-sq 0.408 0.390 0.525 0.439
Business Financial 
Request
Tax Return Request Reporting Score Log Non-Financial 
Request Count
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Section C: Description of Recovery Barrier Composite Score 
This section details the calculation of the Recovery Barrier composite score used in our cross sectional 
tests. It contains four figures:  
Table C1: Variable descriptions 
Table C2: Variables by state 
Table C3: Correlations between state variables 
Figure C1: Map of states and composite scores 
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Table C1: Variable Descriptions 
This section describes the state variables we use to construct our Recovery Barrier composite score and 
provides sources for our data.  
Variable Description 
Judicial Procedures 
State 
An indicator equal to 1 if the bank is headquartered in a state where it must go 
through a court to initiate a mortgage foreclosure, and 0 otherwise. The judicial 
foreclosure process begins with the lender filing a lawsuit and recording a 
notice in the public land records announcing a claim on the property. The 
lawsuit describes the liability and default, and asks the court to permit the lender 
to foreclose its lien and take possession of the property as remedy for non-
payment. The defendant (borrower) is served notice of the complaint, and 
permitted to contest the facts provided by the lender. If the defendant 
demonstrates that differences of material facts exists, the court will hold a trial 
to determine if foreclosure should occur. In 22 states, judicial procedures are the 
primary way to foreclose: Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Vermont, and Wisconsin (Mortgage Bankers Association, n.d.). 
In the remaining states, foreclosure is typically handled outside the judicial 
process. Mortgage contracts give lenders the “power-of-sale” in the event of 
default. The borrower is sent notice of the default, and may cure the debt during 
a prescribed period. If the debt is not cured, the court will authorize a sheriff’s 
sale where the property is sold in auction to the highest bidder. The judicial law 
process is more bureaucratic and time consuming than the power-of-sale 
process (Brown, Ciochetti, and Riddiough [2006]; Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi 
[2014]). 
Process Period The average length of the foreclosure process in the state of the bank’s 
headquarters, measured in days. The period is measured from pre-foreclosure 
through to bank ownership of the property, and is compiled from Realtytrac 
using county and public records. Data on state process periods are drawn from 
www.realtytrac.com/foreclosure-laws/foreclosure-laws-comparison.asp Date of 
access: February 2, 2015. 
If a range is provided (e.g., 170-210 in Delaware), the midpoint is used (190). 
Repossession Barrier An indicator equal to 1 if the bank is headquartered in a state with material 
exceptions to the “peaceful repossession allowable” standard for collateral. 
Examples of material exceptions include requirements that the person 
performing the repossession be bonded for property damage to or conversion of 
such collateral in the amount of $25,000.00 (Colorado), that no attempt to 
enforce the obligation may be made until 20 days after a written notice of right 
to cure default is given to the consumer debtor (Iowa), that no collateral be 
recovered through “self- help” repossession (Louisiana), that vehicles cannot be 
repossessed from property owned or rented by the debtor (Massachusetts), that 
collateral cannot be taken via entry into a dwelling unless such entry has been 
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authorized after default and occurs without the use of force or other breach of 
peace (Maine), or that the borrower is required to sign a voluntary surrender of 
collateral or Replevin Judgment granted through legal action for possession of 
collateral. Data on state laws are drawn from 
www.creditinfocenter.com/legal/auto-repossession-laws.shtml Date of access: 
February 2, 2015.  
Recovery Barrier 
Composite Score 
A composite score ranging from 0 to 3 that measures the difficulty of 
liquidating a borrower. The scale works as follows. The score is the sum of the 
Judicial Procedures State and Repossession Barrier indicators, plus an indicator 
equal to 1 if the Process Period is above the median. 
Low (High) Recovery 
Barrier State 
An indicator equal to 1 if the bank is headquartered in a state that has a 
Recovery Barrier composite score less than 2 (greater than 1), and 0 otherwise.  
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Table C2: Variables by State 
Below, we present the variables for every state. A confidentiality agreement with Sageworks prevents us 
from disclosing the location of banks in our sample, though we find significant variation in the composite 
score components in our sample. All variables are as described in Table C1. 
 
  
Judicial 
Procedures 
State?
Process Period
(days)
Repossession 
Barrier?
State Composite
Score
Low Recovery 
Barrier State?
Alaska No 105 No 0 Yes
Alabama No 49-74 No 0 Yes
Arkansas No 70 No 0 Yes
Arizona No 90 No 0 Yes
California No 117 No 0 Yes
Colorado No 145 Yes 2 No
Connecticut Yes 62 No 1 Yes
District of Columbia No 47 No 0 Yes
Delaware Yes 170-210 No 2 No
Florida Yes 135 No 2 No
Georgia No 37 No 0 Yes
Hawaii Yes 220 No 2 No
Iowa Yes 160 Yes 3 No
Idaho No 150 No 1 Yes
Illinois Yes 300 No 2 No
Indiana Yes 261 No 2 No
Kansas Yes 130 Yes 3 No
Kentucky Yes 147 No 2 No
Louisiana Yes 180 Yes 3 No
Massachusetts No 75 Yes 1 Yes
Maryland No 46 No 0 Yes
Maine Yes 240 Yes 3 No
Michigan No 60 No 0 Yes
Minnesota No 90-100 No 0 Yes
Missouri No 60 Yes 1 Yes
Mississippi No 90 No 0 Yes
Montana No 150 Yes 2 No
North Carolina No 110 No 0 Yes
North Dakota Yes 150 No 2 No
Nebraska No 142 Yes 2 No
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Table C2: Variables by State (continued) 
 
Judicial 
Procedures 
State?
Process Period
(days)
Repossession 
Barrier?
State Composite
Score
Low Recovery 
Barrier State?
New Hampshire No 59 No 0 Yes
New Jersey Yes 270 No 2 No
New Mexico Yes 180 Yes 3 No
Nevada No 116 No 0 Yes
New York Yes 445 No 2 No
Ohio Yes 217 No 2 No
Oklahoma Yes 186 No 2 No
Oregon No 150 No 1 Yes
Pennsylvania Yes 270 No 2 No
Rhode Island No 62 No 0 Yes
South Carolina Yes 150 Yes 3 No
South Dakota Yes 150 No 2 No
Tennessee No 40-45 No 0 Yes
Texas No 27 No 0 Yes
Utah No 142 No 1 Yes
Virginia No 45 No 0 Yes
Vermont Yes 95 No 1 Yes
Washington No 135 No 1 Yes
Wisconsin Yes 290 Yes 3 No
West Virginia No 60-90 No 0 Yes
Wyoming No 60 No 0 Yes
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Table C3: Correlations between State Variables 
The table below presents Pearson correlations between the Recovery Barrier composite score components 
described in Table C1.  
 
 
(1) (2) (3)
(1) Judicial Procedures State 1.00
(2) Process Period 0.17 1.00
(3) Repossession Barrier 0.68 0.14 1.00
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Figure C1: Map of States and Composite Scores 
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